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Gray v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.1/27/2005
fforded under Indiana Code section 22-3-7- 9(f)(1) is uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated.
Pursuant to Collins, we must also consider whether the disparate treatment accorded by Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1) is reasonably related to inherent characteristics that distinguish the unequally treated classes. We have previously stated that " tatutes of repose are based upon considerations of the economic best interests of the public as a whole and are substantive grants of immunity based upon a legislative balance of the respective rights of potential plaintiffs and defendants struck by determining a time limit beyond which liability no longer exists." Kissel, 579 N.E.2d at 1328. We must accord considerable deference to the manner in which our legislature has balanced the competing interests involved. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404-05, 404 N.E.2d 585, 604 (1980). Here, our legislature has struck an economic balance between the interests of individuals who suffer from occupational diseases and their employers. The statute of repose in Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1) reflects the legislative determination that disablement occurring more than three years after the employee's last work-related exposure to silica dust is not an injury for which employers should be liable. It also promotes certainty and finality by limiting the exposure of employers to three years after the last work-related contact with silica dust. The distinction between individuals who suffer disablement within three years of their last exposure to silica dust and those who do not suffer disablement within three years is rationally related to serving these legislative goals and is a permissible balancing of the competing interests involved here. Were we to conclude that Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1) did violate Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution, we would be upsetting the balance created by the legislature, and, in effect, usurping the powers of the legislature by essentially rewriting this statute. See Bunker, 441 N.E.2d at 13. Although we recognize that this result is harsh, we believe we must conclude that Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1) as applied is not unconstitutional pursuant to Article I, Section 23.
Conclusion
We conclude that Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1) as applied is not unconstitutional pursuant to Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. We therefore affirm the Board's order granting Chrysler's motion to dismiss.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
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