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Swift v. Pirnat6/3/2005
een found ambiguous by any court. See Halsey, 722 N.E.2d at 873 n.1 (" e note that neither in Diesel nor in any other case have we questioned the meaning of `injury' to land or chattel, T.R. 75(A)(2), or its validity as a criterion in determining preferred venue.").
For these reasons, we decline Pirnat's invitation to find that part of Subsection (A)(2) discussing claims alleging injury to chattel ambiguous. As a result, we neither consider the intent of the drafters nor apply the "nexus test" set forth in Diesel. We further find the holding in Grove was not altered by this court's statement regarding Subsection (A)(2) in Diesel. See Banjo, 715 N.E.2d at 432 (noting that the holding in Grove has not been questioned, even though its broad statement concerning the ambiguity of Subsection (A)(2) has). Thus, we follow the holdings in Grove and Halsey, and conclude that because Swift alleged injury to chattels in her complaint, Subsection (A)(2) clearly and unambiguously allows preferred venue to lie in the county where the chattel is located. Because the chattel in this case was regularly located in Vigo County, the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Pirnat's Motion for Change of Venue and transferred the case from Vigo County to Vanderburgh County.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court erred when it granted Pirnat's Motion for Change of Venue and transferred the case from Vigo County to Vanderburgh County.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SULLIVAN, J., and NAJAM, J., concur.
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