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Munster v. Groce6/8/2005
tute ineffective service of process if the subject of the summons does not dispute actually having received the complaint and summons. See Boczar v. Reuben, 742 N.E.2d 1010, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
Finally, BWI argues that service upon it via service upon Mikesell was ineffective because the summons was directed only to BWI, not to Mikesell or any other person, such as a "director" or "officer" of BWI. BWI relies upon Volunteers of America v. Premier Auto, 755 N.E.2d 656 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). There, we held that service upon Volunteers of America ("VOA") was ineffective because none of the initial attempts were directed to a person; instead, the summonses were simply addressed to "Volunteers of America." Id. at 660. We also held that this defect in service was not saved by Trial Rule 4.15(F), which provides: "No summons or the service thereof shall be set aside or be adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him, the name of the court, and the time within which he is required to respond." Id. We additionally noted that the first time Premier sent a garnishment proceeding notice to VOA addressed to the "Highest Ranking Officer" was also the first time a "proper person" for corporate service received notice of the lawsuit and default judgment. Id.
Here, the record does seem to indicate that the summons for BWI was addressed only to BWI, and not to any specific individual or title. This case, however, clearly differs from VOA because that case concerned mailings to VOA's office that subsequently were never brought to the attention of a high-ranking corporate officer. Here, by contrast, the summons and complaint were delivered directly to Mikesell's residence and he acknowledged receipt of them; there was no chance that the summons and complaint would fail to follow the proper internal corporate channels to a high-ranking officer or director because they were delivered directly to a director. As such, even if there was a technical defect in the summons to BWI, the method of service by delivery at Mikesell's residence still was reasonably calculated to inform BWI of the pending lawsuit and, in fact, did provide such notice. Trial Rule 4.15(F) excuses minor, technical defects in the method of service where actual service has been accomplished. See Reed Sign Service, Inc. v. Reid, 755 N.E.2d 690, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. In sum, Munster sufficiently complied with the Indiana Trial Rules so as to effect service upon BWI and give the trial court personal jurisdiction over it. Likewise, as we have indicated the method of service on BWI was reasonably calculated so as to provide it with notice of the lawsuit and, therefore, comports with the Due Process Clause. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657. We reverse the trial court's grant of the motion to dismiss with respect to BWI.
Conclusion
Munster has failed to demonstrate that his attempts to serve Groce comported with the Due Process Clause and the trial court was correct to dismiss the lawsuit as to Groce for lack of personal jurisdiction. With respect to BWI, we find sufficient compliance with the Indiana Trial Rules and Due Process Clause regarding service of process to allow the lawsuit against it to proceed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
KIRSCH, C.J., and BAKER, J., concur.
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