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Glasscock v. Corliss3/10/2005
this case, the jury could conclude that the separate acts of two individuals led to separate injuries, each tortfeasor is liable for the damage done by that tortfeasor's actions. Depew v. Burkle, 786 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Here, the evidence supported the jury's finding of separate injuries arising from separate actions by the two defendants. Witnesses testified to separate statements by Glasscock and Moore, on separate occasions to separate audiences, that the jury could have determined to be defamatory. As Corliss suggests, Glasscock's longstanding reputation in the manufactured housing industry could have given added heft to his comments, making them more damaging to Corliss in the jury's eyes. Moreover, the specificity of Glasscock's comments, referring to specific acts rather than using general terms like Moore's use of "thief," could also be viewed as more damaging. Because the evidence supports separate damage amounts for each defendant, we find no error.
The third issue Glasscock and Moore raise relating to damages is that the jury based its decision on improper evidence, specifically evidence of the amount of commissions Corliss forewent when she was terminated and the amount of money Glasscock made when he sold the company. Indiana Evidence Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." We examine issues of admissibility giving deference to the trial court's discretion, finding error only when the trial court's action is clearly erroneous. Laudig v. Marion County Bd. of Voters Registration, 585 N.E.2d 700, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
Evidence that Corliss claimed $49,000 in commissions was admitted at trial with a limiting instruction, as provided by Evidence Rule 105. Corliss argued that the evidence was relevant to show a possible motive for sullying her reputation. Appellant's App. p. 278 (" orty- nine thousand dollars is a good motive to fabricate a position that someone is a thief and you don't have to pay them."). Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that the amount was irrelevant to damages. Id. at 420-21. We cannot say that this reasoning for admission is erroneous, especially with the limiting instruction. Glasscock's economic worth is relevant to the jury's assessment of punitive damages, Stroud v. Lints, 760 N.E.2d 1176, 1183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), so its admission is not erroneous.
Because Glasscock and Moore's final argument regarding damages depends upon the success of one of the first three arguments, we need not address it.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
KIRSCH, C.J. and NAJAM, J., concur.
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