 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Dixon6/3/2005
02). Dixon contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the document because it was not hearsay and its exclusion impinged his right to confront the witness.
Although at trial the motion was offered as an exception to the hearsay rule, on appeal Dixon contends that the motion was not hearsay. A party may not object at trial to the admission of evidence on one ground and then on appeal argue a different objection. State v. Bryant, 272 Kan. 1204, 1208, 38 P.3d 661 (2002). For this reason, we do not consider the argument Dixon makes on appeal. In any event, it does not appear that admission of the document would have added much, if anything, to the testimony. Thus, even if Dixon had made the proper objection at trial, he has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the motion from evidence.
9. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING JERRY HALL TO TESTIFY?
During cross-examination, Jerry Hall was shown his Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Journal Entry of Judgment. He agreed that his probation order included that he would "testify on behalf of the State of Kansas in a consistent and truthful manner as set forth in his inquisition."
The trial judge overruled Dixon's motion in limine, which sought to prevent Hall from testifying at trial on the ground that the probation order placed him under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular way. At trial, defense counsel's renewed objection to Hall's testifying was overruled. The trial court refused to admit Hall's sentencing journal entry on the ground "it was made quite clear to the jury" that Hall was obligated to testify in a truthful manner consistent with his inquisition testimony. On appeal, Dixon contends that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Hall to testify and in excluding the journal entry.
K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 22-3101 sets out the procedure for inquisitions in criminal cases. Subsection (3) provides that " ach witness shall be sworn to make true answers to all questions propounded to such witness touching the matters under investigation. The testimony of each witness shall be reduced to writing and signed by the witness."
Dixon relies on State v. Fisher, 176 Ariz. 69, 74, 859 P.2d 179 (1993), in arguing that the consistency requirement undermined the reliability of Hall's testimony by pressuring him with the threat of imprisonment to persist in one version of the facts. In Fisher, Fisher's wife entered into a plea agreement "conditioned on an avowal by that if she is called as a witness in the trial of [her husband,] James Fisher, and required to testify, her testimony will not vary substantially in relevant areas to the statements previously given to investigative officers . . . ." 176 Ariz. at 80. The Arizona Supreme Court disapproved of the agreement:
"Agreements such as the one involved here undermine the reliability and fairness of the trial and plea bargaining processes and taint the truth-seeking function of the courts by placing undue pressure on witnesses to stick with one version of the facts regardless of its truthfulness. The constraints imposed upon the witness bound by a promise to testify with consistency frustrate the jury's duty to determine the credibility of the witness. . . .
". . . The prosecution should have bargained with [Fisher's wife] only for truthful and accurate testimony. Such an agreement maintains the integrity of the plea agreement process and promotes a fair trial without encouraging unreliable testimony." 176 Ariz. at 74.
Hall's probation order differs from the agreement in Fisher in requiring the witness to testify consistently
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 Kansas Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|