 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Gerald-Singleton v. U of L Healthcare University Hospital4/1/2005
we believe once a single WC-3 letter is received by the injured worker, the protection requirements to the employee underlying KRS 342.040(1) have been satisfied and the notice obligation of the employer is ended unless and until voluntary payments to the employee are in fact "resumed." Gerald-Singleton disagrees with the Board. Her interpretation of KRS 342.040(1) is that the statute of limitations may also be tolled when an employer has refused to pay additional TTD benefits and has failed to notify the Commissioner, even though the employer has previously paid TTD benefits, has previously terminated the benefits, has previously given timely notification to the Commissioner, and the employee has previously received a WC-3 letter. Gerald-Singleton cites neither statute nor case law to support her interpretation.
Gerald-Singleton contends that she was entitled to additional TTD benefits when she missed 22 hours of work in February 2002 allegedly due to work-related back pain. And, according to her interpretation of KRS 342.040(1), since U of L refused to pay her additional TTD benefits and failed to notify the Commissioner, the two-year statute of limitations was tolled.
When reviewing the Board's decisions, we reverse only when the Board has overlooked or misconstrued controlling law or so flagrantly erred in evaluating the evidence that its decision has resulted in a gross injustice. To properly review the Board's decision, we must ultimately consider the ALJ's underlying decision. If the ALJ has found against the claimant, who has the burden of proof, we must determine whether the evidence compelled a finding in the claimant's favor. "Compelling evidence" is evidence so overwhelming that no reasonable person could reach the same conclusion as the fact-finder. The ALJ, as fact-finder, has sole discretion to determine the quality, character, and substance of the evidence. Not only does the ALJ weigh the evidence, she may also choose to believe or disbelieve any part of the evidence, regardless of its source. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.
When we interpret a statute, we attempt to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. We may neither add to nor subtract from the statute. Neither will we interpret it in such a way to produce an absurd result. Were we to adopt Gerald-Singleton's interpretation of KRS 342.040, we would reach an absurd result. A claimant could easily circumvent the two-year statute of limitations, after receiving a WC-3 letter, by claiming entitlement to additional TTD benefits by alleging that she had missed additional time from work, after the statute of limitations had run, due to a work-related injury . This would eviscerate the two-year statute of limitations. In contrast, the Board's interpretation preserves and effectuates both the statute of limitations found in KRS 342.185 and the exceptions to it found in KRS 342.040.
The ALJ and the Board correctly determined, based on their evaluation of the evidence presented, that the statute of limitations had run before Gerald-Singleton's claim was filed. Since neither misconstrued the law nor erred in their evaluation of the evidence, we affirm the Board's decision.
ALL CONCUR.
Page 1 2 Kentucky Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|