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Cox v. Boggs4/6/2005
Michael Cox appeals a judgment dismissing his claim for breach of contract and quantum meruit against A. Michael Boggs on exceptions of lis pendens and no cause of action. For the reasons expressed, we affirm.
Factual Background
Cox and Boggs are both attorneys in Bossier City. They were never partners, but from 1992 through 2003 they "worked together amicably" in numerous cases, sharing labor, costs and expertise. In June 2004, Cox filed this suit for "specific performance, damages for breach of contract and/or quantum meruit," alleging that Boggs owed him money as a result of their agreements in two cases.
The first case, Boggs v. Sasaki, was a medical malpractice action in which Boggs was a plaintiff seeking damages for allegedly negligent medical care rendered to his father, Luke Boggs. According to the petition, Boggs retained Cox to represent himself, his father and other family members on a contingency fee basis. The petition did not allege that Boggs acted as counsel in this case or agreed to divide any attorney fees. Cox claimed he worked on the case for over two years, logging over 89 hours; however, in late 2003 Boggs dismissed him as his attorney, advising that he would not honor their contingency fee agreement and would hire another attorney. Cox also alleged that Boggs made no offer to pay him for the time already spent on the case. Cox prayed for $18,156.50, on a theory of quantum meruit, for his work in this case.
The second case, Brawley v. Hamm, was one in which Cox and Boggs had worked together as lawyers; it was still pending in the First JDC. The petition disclosed no details of the case, but asserted that Boggs refused to pay Cox his percentage despite amicable demands. Cox prayed for 40% of the attorney fee in this case.
Boggs responded with exceptions of lis pendens as to the Brawley claim and no cause of action as to the Boggs claim. Boggs showed that before filing the instant suit, Cox had filed a privilege for lien and professional fees in Brawley. Since the privilege was filed first, Boggs urged the instant suit, seeking recognition of the same claim, should not be allowed to proceed. The exception of no cause of action urged that Boggs was pending before a medical review panel, and the proper procedure to enforce his alleged contingency fee was an intervention in that proceeding. Boggs also alleged that Cox has no cause of action against him for a contingency fee, but only against his client. By memorandum, Boggs also argued that the contingency fee could be recovered only when the claim was collected. Boggs conceded that he and Cox had worked together and agreed to split the fees, on a contingency basis, in both Boggs and Brawley, and that he had terminated their business relationship on October 15, 2003, paying Cox $25,425.49 as his portion of the fee in Brawley.
Cox opposed the exceptions, reiterating that in Boggs, Boggs was a client, and arguing that in Brawley, Boggs discharged him when the case reached the stage of settlement with the last insurer. He also argued that the lien in Brawley only preserved his claim in the event of settlement, did not establish or determine his rights, and involved different parties than the instant suit. Finally, he urged that in Boggs, the action for quantum meruit is recognized when the parties no longer have a contingency fee contract.
At a hearing in August 2004, each party argued on his own behalf. Boggs agreed that although he had filed an exception of no cause of action as to the Boggs claim, his argument was really one of prematurity, as the plaintiffs had not yet recovered anything. The district court sustained both exceptions and rendered judgment
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