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Boyd v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.1/20/2005
very under § 232).
As discussed supra, Kelly's entry on to the railroad tracks when the gates were lowered violated § 218. Thus, the plaintiff could not recover under § 232. Accordingly, the defendants were entitled to judgment on the plaintiff's wrongful death claims against Amtrak and the MBTA alleging statutory violations.
III. Wrongful Death Based on Wilful, Wanton, or Reckless Conduct
As stated supra, a wrongful death claim can be brought against someone who, through wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct, causes the death of another. G. L. c. 229, § 2. To show the defendants' wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct, the plaintiff points to evidence that the train's speed was in excess of 70 mph, that four-quadrant gates had not been installed as required by Massachusetts law, St. 1996, c. 151, § 648, and that the defendants failed to act in spite of their knowledge that children were walking and bicycling around lowered safety gates to cross the tracks at other crossings on the Old Colony line.
The motion judge held that Amtrak and the MBTA were not liable for wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct, specifically ruling that (a) local speed limit and gate requirements are preempted by Federal law; (b) 23 U.S.C. § 409 (1994 & Supp. III 1998) protects from discovery or admission in evidence documents related to the defendants' knowledge of children going around the safety gates; and (c) the remaining admissible evidence produced by the plaintiff was insufficient to prove wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct.
A. Federal Preemption
The Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101 et seq. (1994), Pub. L. 103-272, § 1(e), 108 Stat. 863 et seq., was enacted to promote safety in all areas of railroad operations and to reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents. See 49 U.S.C. § 20101; CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 661 (1993). The FRSA gives the United States Secretary of Transportation broad powers to prescribe regulations and issue orders for all areas of railroad safety. See 49 U.S.C. § 20103(a); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 662.
The FRSA contains an express Federal preemption provision. See 49 U.S.C. § 20106 ("A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement"); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, supra. The preemption provision, however, contains a savings clause indicating that a State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order when it "is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard" (emphasis added). 49 U.S.C. § 20106(1). CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, supra. The savings clause relates to specific local hazards that are "aberrations," involving factors that the Secretary of Transportation did not and, as a practical matter, could not take into account in determining laws or regulations under the FRSA. See Armstrong v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 844 F. Supp. 1152, 1153 (W.D. Tex. 1994); O'Bannon v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 960 F. Supp. 1411, 1420 (W.D. Mo. 1997). Cases where Federal law has not preempted state law center around the duty to avoid "a specific collision." See Armstrong v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 844 F. Supp. at 1153; Beausoleil v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 119, 121 (D. Mass. 2001).
The individual, local hazard cannot be Statewide in character and cannot be capable of being adequately encompassed within uniform, national standards. See United Transp. Union v. Foster, 20
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