 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Dilbert v. Hanover Insurance Co.4/27/2005
(1992). Moreover, that some or even many of the underlying claims may fall outside the policy coverage does not excuse the insurer from its defense obligation. Simplex Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 Mass. 196, 199 (1999), citing Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 30 Mass. App. Ct. 318, 322 (1991).
b. Claim Against the Insureds for Wrongful Entry
The policy endorsement at issue here modifies the definition of "bodily injury" to include injury arising out of "wrongful entry." The plaintiffs argue that the complaint against them alleged wrongful entry, drawing that term from within the definitional language of the policy. Contrast LaFrance v. Travelers Ins. Co., 32 Mass. App. Ct. 987, 988 (1992). The policy endorsement does not define the term wrongful entry, and Massachusetts courts have yet to address the definition of that term as set out in an insurance policy. However, as the following analysis establishes, a claim for simple trespass will support the insureds' demand that the insurer owes a duty of defense against the underlying complaint. While Remsen alleged other claims against the plaintiffs that are not reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that they state or adumbrate a claim covered by policy terms, we hold that the complaint and answers to interrogatories provided to Hanover set forth a claim for wrongful entry. See Ruggerio Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 430 Mass. at 796.
Relying on Dryden Oil Co. of New England v. Travelers Indem. Co., 91 F.3d 278, 287 (1st Cir. 1996) (Dryden), Hanover argues that wrongful entry is a cause of action found exclusively in landlord-tenant law, and that therefore Remsen's complaint could not have alleged it. We disagree.
The court in Dryden held that the wrongful entry clause of a comprehensive general liability policy did not cover a cause of action outside the landlord-tenant relationship. The court "decline to broaden the scope of the Massachusetts tort of wrongful entry absent a clear signal from the Commonwealth's courts," id. at 287 n.9, because the "Massachusetts tort of wrongful entry has yet to be extended beyond trespasses by landlords upon the leased premises." Id. at 287.
Although the court in Dryden stated that "Massachusetts case law has defined the tort of wrongful entry only in the context of an intrusion by the landlord upon the premises leased by its tenant," id. at 287 n.9, we note that our appellate courts have not had the opportunity to distinguish wrongful entry and trespass in any meaningful way. The few Massachusetts appellate decisions that employ the term "wrongful entry" do not restrict it to landlord-tenant situations, and use trespass and wrongful entry interchangeably. See, e.g., Brown v. General Trading Co., 310 Mass. 263, 267-268 (1941) (plaintiff sought ruling that entry by defendant was wrongful, where defendant was not landlord); Tinkham v. Wind, 319 Mass. 158, 159 (1946) (plaintiff sued in tort for damages for alleged wrongful entry by defendant and deprivation of possession of premises leased from defendant); Western Mass. Theatres, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 655, 657 (1968) ("The defendant has not raised the issue whether the wrongful entry was felonious"); Gidwani v. Wasserman, 373 Mass. 162, 163 (1977) ("plaintiff lessee . . . brought an action for breach of contract and tort for trespass . . . [seeking] recovery for wrongful entry and possession of premises" [emphasis supplied]).
Cases from other jurisdictions also have employed the term "wrongful entry" outside the landlord-tenant context. See, e.g., Wackenhut Servs., Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 15 F. S
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Massachusetts Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|