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Smith v. Bell Atlantic6/10/2005
Middlesex.
October 4, 2004
Present: Lenk, Grasso, & Cohen, JJ.
Anti-Discrimination Law, Employment, Handicap, Damages. Employment, Discrimination. Evidence, Expert opinion. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Words, "Qualified handicapped person."
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 5, 1998.
The case was tried before Judith Fabricant, J., and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was heard by her.
In this action brought pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 9, a jury awarded damages to the plaintiff, Doreen Smith, on account of the failure of her employer, the defendant telephone company (company), to reasonably accommodate her handicap, in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4(16). After concluding that the opinion of Smith's medical expert was deficient and had to be struck, the trial judge allowed the company's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to Smith's claims for future damages; but the judge refused to disturb the jury's award for emotional distress suffered by Smith while she remained in the company's employ. Before us are the parties' cross appeals.
Smith's primary argument is that it was error to strike the opinion of her medical expert on the causal relationship between the company's failure to accommodate and the permanent decline in her health, and that, therefore, the jury's awards for front pay and other future damages should be reinstated. She also claims that the judge erred in directing a verdict for the company on her claim for punitive damages, that the judge improperly reduced her requested award of fees and costs, and that prejudgment interest was not properly computed.
The company argues that its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been allowed in its entirety, because no reasonable jury could find that Smith was a "qualified handicapped person" and because it made accommodations that were reasonable as matter of law. The company also contends that Smith was not entitled to rely upon events that occurred under supervisors who had not been named in the charge Smith filed with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), and that both the jury's award for emotional distress and the judge's award of attorneys' fees and costs were excessive.
We conclude that all of the challenged rulings were correct and, accordingly, affirm.
1. Factual Background
We summarize the facts as the jury could have found them, adding details as needed during our discussion of the issues.
From 1978 to 1999, Smith was employed by the company in its various iterations. Over the years, Smith, a college graduate with postgraduate engineering training, performed a number of different jobs and attained the position of "second-level manager." Smith succeeded in the workplace despite having a significant disability. When she was two years old, Smith contracted polio and, after a long and difficult recovery that included a year in an iron lung and many surgical procedures, she was left with paralysis in one leg and diminished use of the other.
As an adult, Smith ambulated using wrist-braced crutches, until 1992, when she began to experience increased fatigue, loss of body strength, and pain. She then started to use a scooter for all but short distances, transporting it in a large van equipped with hand controls and a lift. Eventually, Smith was diagnosed with post polio syndrome (PPS), a degenerative condition affecting some polio survivors.
PPS is a consequence of polio's effects upon nerve cells, some of which die, some of which are inf
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