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Christensen v. Philip Morris USA Inc.6/8/2005
walt, 314 Md. at 437-38; Goldstein, 285 Md. 684.
Quoting Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945), the Court of Appeals explained in Walko Corporation v. Burger Systems, Inc., 281 Md. 207, 210 (1977):
"Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost.... (citation omitted). They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay. They have come into the law not through the judicial process but through legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate."
The applicable statute of limitations for this case is found in § 5-101 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article ("C.J.") of the Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.). It states: "A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced." Additional sections of the Code set forth alternative statutes of limitations for specified actions. The Code also provides for tolling under certain circumstances. See, e.g., C.J. § 5-201 (persons under a disability); C.J. § 5-202 (time between debtor's insolvency petition and dismissal of petition); C.J. § 5-205 (absence from State or moving from county).
To be sure, tolling of limitations for class representatives or class members is not specifically mentioned. However, when, as here, a Maryland procedural or evidentiary rule is derived from, and closely mirrors, a federal rule, our appellate courts have looked to federal law to interpret the corresponding Maryland rule. In Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 716 (1995), for example, the Court of Appeals remarked that when a Maryland evidentiary rule has a counterpart in the federal rules, it is proper to "look to federal cases interpreting the federal rule for guidance in interpreting" the Maryland Rule. See also Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 355 (1993) (noting that when a Maryland rule of procedure derives from a federal rule, "interpretations of that federal rule are persuasive as to the meaning and proper applications of the Maryland rule"); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 738 n.8 (1993) (observing that, " ecause the Maryland summary judgment rule is derived from the federal rule, judicial interpretations of the federal rule are persuasive as to the meaning and proper application of the Maryland rule").
In Snowden v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 300 Md. 555, 562 (1984), the Court of Appeals considered whether an order denying class certification constituted a final judgment for purposes of appeal. In its analysis, the Court found "instructive" the Supreme Court's opinion in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). Relying on that decision and other federal appellate decisions, the Court of Appeals concluded that an order denying class certification is not immediately appealable. See also Pollokoff v. Md. Nat'l Bank, 288 Md. 485, 491-94 (1980)(analyzing Md. Rule 209, the predecessor to our current class action rule, and referring to the Supreme Court's interpretation of FRCP 23); Johnson v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 26 Md. App. 122 (1975) (looking to the Supreme Court's opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), to aid in our interpretation of Md. Rule 209).
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