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Christensen v. Philip Morris USA Inc.6/8/2005
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More recently, the Court of Appeals remarked in the Richardson class action case that " here a dearth of authority in Maryland analyzing the specific requirements" of Md. Rule 2-231. Philip Morris, 358 Md. at 724. Yet, the Court acknowledged that "there exists an abundance of cases from other jurisdictions, federal and state, that have analyzed class action rules either identical to or similar to Maryland's rule." Id. Of significance here, the Court specifically drew on those federal and state cases to "aid analysis in determining whether" the circuit court "applied the correct legal standards in reaching its decision" with respect to class certification. Id. at 726. In reaching its conclusion that the circuit court erred with regard to class certification, the Court took into account an "almost unanimous reluctance" of a "myriad of federal and state courts" to certify class actions for mass tort tobacco litigation. Id. at 729.
Because the Court of Appeals in Richardson looked for guidance to the federal courts and other state courts with comparable class action rules to analyze the propriety of the class certification, we believe it is also appropriate for this Court to review the "abundance" of cases from other courts that have considered class action tolling. These cases guide our analysis.
In 1974, the Supreme Court first considered the issue of equitable tolling in class action suits brought under FRCP Rule 23. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), involved a federal antitrust action brought by the State of Utah on behalf of itself and other public agencies. The suit was filed eleven days before the applicable statute of limitations was to expire. During the course of the litigation, the federal district court ruled that the suit could not proceed as a class action. Eight days after the trial court denied class certification, numerous Utah towns, municipalities, and water-and-sewer districts moved to intervene in the suit. Id. at 543-44. Ruling that limitations had expired, the district court denied the motion. Id. at 544.
The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the motions to intervene were not time-barred. It reasoned that unless the filing of a class action tolled limitations, potential class members would be induced to file motions to intervene or to join in the suit, merely to protect themselves in the event of the denial of class certification. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553. In its view, such a result would thwart two key goals of the class action procedure: promotion of efficiency and economy of litigation. Id. Therefore, to protect the policies undergirding the class action procedure, the Court held that "the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action."
Id. at 554.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart said:
Under present Rule 23 ... the difficulties and potential for unfairness which, in part, convinced some courts to require individualized satisfaction of the statute of limitations by each member of the class, have been eliminated, and there remain no conceptual or practical obstacles in the path of holding that the filing of a timely class action complaint commences the action for all members of the class as subsequently determined. Whatever the merit in the conclusion that one seeking to join a class after the running of the statutory period asserts a "separate cause of action" which must individually meet the timeliness requirements, such a concept is simply inconsistent with Rule 23 as presently drafted. A federal class act
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