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Christensen v. Philip Morris USA Inc.6/8/2005
ion is no longer "an invitation to joinder" but a truly representative suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage, unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions. Under the circumstances of this case, where the District Court found that the named plaintiffs asserted claims that were "typical of the claims or defenses of the class" and would "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," Rule 23(a)(3),(4), the claimed members of the class stood as parties to the suit until and unless they received notice thereof and chose not to continue. Thus, the commencement of the action satisfied the purpose of the limitation provision as to all those who might subsequently participate in the suit as well as for the named plaintiffs. To hold to the contrary would frustrate the principal function of a class suit, because then the sole means by which members of the class could assure their participation in the judgment if notice of the class suit did not reach them until after the running of the limitation period would be to file earlier individual motions to join or intervene as parties - precisely the multiplicity of activity which Rule 23 was designed to avoid in those cases where a class action is found "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Rule 23(b)(3).
Id. at 550-51 (emphasis added) (some citations omitted).
Further, the Supreme Court said:
We hold that in this posture, at least where class action status has been denied solely because of failure to demonstrate that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable," the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action status....
A contrary rule allowing participation only by those potential members of the class who had earlier filed motions to intervene in the suit would deprive Rule 23 class actions of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure....
Id. at 552-53 (emphasis added).
In the Court's view, the result was "in no way inconsistent with the functional operation of a statute of limitations." Id. at 554. It reasoned: "Since the imposition of a time bar would not in this circumstance promote the purposes of the statute of limitations, the tolling rule we establish here is consistent both with the procedures of Rule 23 and with the proper function of the limitations statute." Id. at 555. Moreover, the Court expressly rejected the contention that limitations is the sole prerogative of Congress, because it constitutes a "`substantive' element" of a claim. Id. at 556. To the contrary, it concluded that "the mere fact that a federal statute providing for substantive liability also sets a time limitation upon the institution of suit does not restrict the power of the federal courts to hold that the statute of limitations is tolled under certain circumstances not inconsistent with the legislative purpose." Id. at 559. Accord Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 n.13 (1974) (recognizing that American Pipe "established that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the class").
In Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983), decided nine years later, Parker claimed that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII. He procured a "right to sue" letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). While Parker's complaint was pending before t
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