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Christensen v. Philip Morris USA Inc.6/8/2005
stop or impede its operation." Ruff v. Bull, 7 H. & J. 14, 16, 16 Am. Dec. 290 (1825). The rule has lost little of its vitality.
This venerable rule, which defers to the legislative intent expressed in the statute of limitations itself, and avoids implied exceptions or strained constructions, is also applicable in cases such as the one at bar where an action filed initially within the required period fails for some technical, procedural defect falling short of a full decision on the merits. Absent a statutory provision saving the plaintiff's rights, the remedy is barred where limitations has run during the pendency of the defective suit.
Id. at 210-12 (some internal citations omitted).
In reaching its result, the Court indicated that there were no facts that warranted the relaxation of "the anti-tolling rule." Id. at 215. Moreover, it observed that, following the denial of the motion to intervene, eleven days remained before limitations expired, and the appellant offered no explanation for the failure to file a timely action. Id.
In McMahan v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155 (1944), the Court held that payment of interest or principal on a debt does not toll limitations for a contract action. It said, id. at 159-60:
Statutes of limitations are remedial legislation and rest upon sound public policy, for they are enacted to afford protection against stale claims after a lapse of time which ought to be sufficient for a person of ordinary diligence, and after which the defendant might be placed at a disadvantage by reason of long delay. By requiring persons to seek redress by actions at law within a reasonable time, the Legislature imposes a salutary vigilance and puts an end to litigation. Accordingly, the Courts should refuse to give statutes of limitations a strained construction to evade their effect.... "It would be going far for this court to add to those exceptions. * * * If this difficulty be produced by the legislative power, the same power might provide a remedy; but courts cannot, on that account, insert in the statute of limitations an exception which the statute does not contain." McIver v. Ragan, 2 Wheat. 25, 29, 30, 4 L.Ed. 175, 177. We conclude that, where the Legislature has not made an exception in express words in the Statute of Limitations, the Court cannot allow any implied and equitable exception to be engrafted upon the statute merely on the ground that such exception would be within the spirit or reason of the statute.
On the other hand, in Bertonazzi v. Hillman, Adm'x, 241 Md. 361 (1966), the Court relied on the concept of tolling to craft a narrow exception to the general rule against implied exceptions to the statute of limitations. The exception was limited to cases that were timely filed but later dismissed, based on improper venue, after limitations had expired. In its decision, the Court recognized that Maryland was one of only a few states that lacked either a savings statute or a venue transfer statute. Therefore, the Court concluded that "the commencement of the suit ... tolled the statute [of limitations]." Id. at 371. But see Walko Corp., 281 Md. at 214 ("Bertonazzi stands alone ... confined to the special circumstances which culminated in the filing of the suit in the wrong county").
The Court of Appeals has recognized, however, that the terms "accrual" and "tolling" have occasionally been used "interchangeably," albeit imprecisely, when "the application has been the same: to prevent limitations from running...." Hecht, supra, 333 Md. at 339 n.11. In Hecht, the Court adopted the doctrine of adverse domination with respect to claims by a corporation against its directors for injuries
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
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