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Christensen v. Philip Morris USA Inc.6/8/2005
ion, however, our ruling does not extend to Giant.
II.
Because there is no equitable tolling as to Giant, we must also consider the court's ruling that the appellants' claim were barred by limitations. In its view, appellants' claims accrued at the time the Decedent learned that he had lung cancer, rather than when he learned his cancer was caused by cigarette smoking, and therefore suit was untimely filed.
Appellants argue, in part:
n issue of material fact existed as to the reasonableness of Mr. Christensen's actions and his knowledge during this period of time. Whether Mr. Christensen believed that he had cancer is a foregone conclusion. Whether he should have reasonably surmised that it was caused by his smoking is an issue of material fact and one that can only be decided by the jury.
According to appellees, the trial court correctly determined that appellants' "claims accrued more than three years before they were filed." They rely on the doctrine of "inquiry notice" to support their contention that appellants' claims were untimely filed. In their view, the Decedent "was on inquiry notice that he may have had a claim against defendants no later than the Spring of 1998," when he learned that he had lung cancer. In support of this contention, appellees point out that, from at least the 1970's, Christensen knew generally that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer. Therefore, they insist that, even though the Decedent last smoked in 1976, he was on inquiry notice of the cause of his cancer well before the cause was clinically determined through the biopsy.
Moreover, appellees maintain that "Maryland courts have repeatedly held that an expert opinion on the cause of an injury is not necessary to put a claimant on inquiry notice so that the statute of limitations begins to run." They add:
The undisputed facts, drawn from the testimony of Mr. Christensen and appellants themselves, demonstrate that Mr. Christensen was well aware of the association between lung cancer and cigarette smoking long before 1998. Thus, when he knew in the Spring of 1998 that he had lung cancer, he had knowledge of all the circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to investigate whether he had a claim.
Under C.J. ยง 5-101, civil litigants generally have three years from the date their action accrues to file suit. See Am. Gen. Assurance Co. v. Pappano, 374 Md. 339, 348 (2003); Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 333 (1994). "Historically, the general rule in Maryland was that a cause of action accrued on the date the wrong was committed," regardless of whether the plaintiff knew or should have known of the wrong. Id. at 334. However, Maryland now applies the discovery rule to the concept of accrual. See Bank of N. Y. v. Sheff, 382 Md. 235, 244 (2004); Pappano, 374 Md. at 351; Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 186-87 (1917). That rule was adopted to address the "unfairness inherent in charging a plaintiff with slumbering on rights not reasonably possible to ascertain...." Hecht, 333 Md. at 334.
Pursuant to the discovery rule, a "cause of action accrues when a plaintiff in fact knows or reasonably should know of the wrong." Hecht, 333 Md. at 334; see O'Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 302 (1986) (stating that, under the discovery rule, limitations commences when a reasonable person is "`on notice,'" and has sufficient knowledge to prompt a reasonable person to "undertake an investigation which, if pursued with reasonable diligence, would have led to knowledge" of the tort); Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636 (1981) (holding that a cause of action accrues when "the claimant knew or reasonably should have known
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