Smith v. Lead Industries Association4/4/2005
her plaintiffs would be inefficient, at best, and possibly foolish." That was so, it said, because the facts for each family of plaintiffs were different and because a decision in the Smith appeal might clarify issues that remain in the other cases. On that ground, the intermediate appellate court, invoking Maryland Rule 8-602(e)(1)(C), purported to enter final judgment on the Smith claims and proceeded to address the substantive issues presented in the appeal.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment with respect to the fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional concealment claims on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence of reliance on their part, which the appellate court held was necessary to establish liability. The court also agreed that the manufacturers of non-lead-based paint had no duty to warn the plaintiffs of the hazards associated with the removal of lead paint, not made by them, when preparing the surface for repainting. The court found no duty owing to the plaintiffs by the two trade associations. The one area in which the appellate court disagreed with the trial court concerned the liability of the defendants that produced lead pigment and lead paint - claims of alternative liability, negligent product design, supplier negligence, strict liability for defective design, and liability of commercial sellers for harm caused by products into which harmful components are integrated. Judgments with respect to those claims against those defendants were reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
DISCUSSION
In Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 165, 725 A.2d 549, 560 (1999), we confirmed the long-standing rule that " he right to seek appellate review ordinarily must await the entry of a final judgment, disposing of all claims against all parties," and that there were only three exceptions to that rule: appeals from interlocutory rulings specifically allowed by statute (Maryland Code, § 12-303 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article), immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602(b), and appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine. See also Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 100, 109-10, 840 A.2d 114, 119 (2003). In Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989), we held that:
"If a ruling of the court is to constitute a final judgment, it must have at least three attributes: (1) it must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy, (2) unless the court properly acts pursuant to Md. Rule 2-602(b), it must adjudicate or complete the adjudication of all claims against all parties, and (3) the clerk must make a proper record of it in accordance with Md. Rule 2-601."
See also Walk v. Hartford Casualty, 382 Md. 1, 10-11, n.4, 852 A.2d 98, 103-04, n.4 (2004); Jones v. Hubbard, 356 Md. 513, 524, 740 A.2d 1004, 1010 (1999); Board of Liquor v. Fells Point Cafe, 344 Md. 120, 129, 685 A.2d 772, 776 (1996).
Clearly, as the Court of Special Appeals recognized, the various orders entered by the Circuit Court in this case do not constitute, or even come close to constituting, a final judgment under the criteria stated in Rohrbeck. Most of the claims pled by the Brantley, Hamilton, and Shorter plaintiffs are unresolved, and, indeed, as we shall explain, some of the claims pled by the Smith plaintiffs appear also to be unresolved. Nor are any of the trial court's rulings appealable under the collateral order doctrine or under Maryland Code, § 12-303 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article. If they are appealable at this time, it can only be pursuant to Marylan
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|