 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Smith v. Lead Industries Association4/4/2005
d Rule 2-602(b).
Rule 2-602(a) provides generally that an order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims in an action, less than an entire claim, or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties to the action (1) is not a final judgment, (2) does not terminate the action as to any of the claims or any of the parties, and (3) is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment that adjudicates all of the claims by and against all of the parties. Section (b) of the Rule permits the Circuit Court, if it expressly determines in a written order that there is no just reason for delay, to direct in the order the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties or for some but less than all of the amount requested in a claim seeking only money relief. The Circuit Court made no such determination and entered no such order. The appeal was therefore one that is not allowed by law and should have been dismissed.
Maryland Rule 8-602(e)(1) permits this Court or the Court of Special Appeals, if it concludes that an order from which the appeal was taken was not a final judgment when the notice of appeal was filed but that the lower court had discretion to direct the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602(b), to dismiss the appeal, to remand the case for the lower court to decide whether to enter a final judgment under Rule 2-602(b), or to enter a final judgment on its own initiative. If it chooses the latter option, the Rule directs that it treat the notice of appeal as if filed on the date it enters the judgment and proceed with the appeal.
In this case, as noted, the Court of Special Appeals chose that third option, believing that it would be inefficient and possibly "foolish" to do otherwise. We disagree. There are so many loose ends left in the Circuit Court that, to proceed with this appeal now would be to do what we, and the Court of Special Appeals, have consistently held ought not to be done. Neither efficiency nor the avoidance of "foolishness" is served.
As we have indicated, the appellate court implicitly assumed that all claims by the Smith plaintiffs had been resolved against all of the defendants. That does not appear to be the case. Although LIA and perhaps the other parties thought otherwise, the record indicates that, when LIA filed for bankruptcy on April 4, 2002, Counts IV, VI, VII, IX, and X were still open against it, and, because of the bankruptcy stay, those claims, by the Smith plaintiffs, have yet to be resolved. See Starfish Condo. v. Yorkridge Serv., 292 Md. 557, 565-66, 440 A.2d 373, 378 (1982). If that is so, as it appears to be, the trial court could not have entered a final judgment under Rule 2-602(b) unless it severed LIA as a defendant because, given the nature of the allegations against LIA, that would have amounted to splitting a single claim, which is not allowed.
As the trial court noted in its memorandum of February 14, 2002, the complaint against the trade associations was that (1) they were charged with the responsibility of establishing standards in order to require that the products manufactured and sold by their members were safe, (2) they permitted officers of companies who had knowledge of the dangers of lead to form their policies, and (3) they acted as agents for the other defendants in committing the intentional torts and were equally liable. Those allegations served as the basis for the liability asserted against LIA in all of the counts in the Third Amended Complaint, and thus all of those counts, under our case law, constituted a single claim. See Biro v. Schombert, 285 Md. 290, 402 A.2d 71 (1979);
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
By using the system, you agree to TERMS OF SERVICE
|