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Apsey v. Memorial Hospital6/9/2005
the court treated as a motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs argued that MCL 565.262 should apply to the exclusion of MCL 600.2102. The court was not persuaded, and, without elaboration, stated that arguments concerning MCL 565.262 would not have changed its earlier decision.
Defendant Deering argues that the specific mention of affidavits in MCL 600.2102 indicates greater legislative specificity than the general mention of notarial acts in MCL 565.262. However, the general language of the latter is obviously a consequence of the statute covering acts performed in some cases by persons other than notaries public and coverage of notarial acts performed on documents other than affidavits. The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Haworth, supra at 227. Notaries public, both in and out of state, are expressly mentioned in MCL 565.262(a), along with the function of "attesting documents." Affidavits, and the role of the notary public in executing them, are obviously envisioned.
Both plaintiffs and defendants raise issues regarding the placement of the statutes. " he meaning of the Legislature is to be found in the terms and arrangement of the statute without straining or refinement, and the expressions used are to be taken in their natural and ordinary sense." Gross v Gen Motors Corp, 448 Mich 147, 160; 528 NW2d 707 (1995) (emphasis added). It is well, then, to note the structural placement of the two statutory schemes.
The URAA appears among statutes governing conveyances of real property. The emphasis, then, is not on documents submitted to Michigan courts, but on documents that have potentially great legal significance in other contexts, e.g., memorializing agreements or recording conveyances and interests. However, contrary to defendants' contentions, we find that the URAA and its requirements are not limited to conveyances of real property.
MCL 600.2102 appears within the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.101 et seq., and retains its predecessor's language concerning affidavits "received in judicial proceedings," which our Supreme Court construed as strictly requiring that special certification accompany notarizations by out-of-state notaries public. In re Alston's Estate, supra at 481-482. Plaintiffs point out that this statute is sandwiched between provisions governing evidence, and argue that it thus applies only when the affidavit in question is to be read into evidence. However, the statute itself sets forth what is required for a sister-state affidavit "to be read," not to be read specifically into evidence. The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed, Pohutski v Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d 219 (2002). "Read" for this purpose means acknowledged and considered by the court, not necessarily read into evidence. See Berkery v Wayne Circuit Judge, 82 Mich 160, 167-168; 46 NW 436 (1890).
Thus, neither the provisions of the URAA, in particular MCL 565.262 and MCL 565.263, nor MCL 600.2102 are rendered inapplicable based on structural placement. Both statutes relate to authentication and share the common purpose of requiring verification for the authenticity of out of state notarial acts. As such, the statutes are in pari materia. Statutes that relate to the same subject or share a common purpose are in pari materia and must be read together as one law, even if they contain no reference to one another and were enacted on different dates. State Treasurer v Schuster, 456 Mich 408, 417; 572 NW2d 628 (1998); Houghton Lake Area Tourism & Convention Bureau v Wood, 255 Mich App 127; 146; 662 NW2d 758 (2003). And, statutes that have a common purpo
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