 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Lindsey v. St. John Health System3/22/2005
UNPUBLISHED
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the circuit court order granting defendants' motion for summary disposition. The circuit court concluded that plaintiff's complaint alleged medical malpractice and, therefore, was procedurally deficient and also barred by the two-year statute of limitations governing malpractice actions, MCL 600.5805(6). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
This action arises from plaintiff's hospitalization at St. John Riverview Hospital from May 10 through May 14, 2000. Plaintiff commenced this action on May 8, 2003, alleging that she was treated rudely and unprofessionally by hospital nursing staff during her hospitalization. Plaintiff further alleged that a nurse injected an unknown substance into her IV, causing her to become ill, and that hospital staff thereafter failed to respond to her calls for assistance, causing her injury. Plaintiff's complaint included counts for (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) ordinary negligence, (3) gross negligence, (4) negligent entrustment, (5) proprietary function, and (6) breach of warranties. Defendants moved for summary disposition on the ground that, substantively, plaintiff's complaint alleged medical malpractice and, therefore, was barred because it was both procedurally defective and untimely under the two-year limitation period for malpractice actions, MCL 600.5805(6). Plaintiff argued that she properly raised claims for tort and breach of contract, which were governed by three-year and six-year statutes of limitation, respectively. See MCL 600.5805(10) and MCL 600.5807(8). The trial court agreed with defendants and granted their motion for summary disposition.
We review a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Although defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), " n determining whether the nature of a claim is ordinary negligence or medical malpractice, as well as whether such claim is barred because of the statute of limitations, a court does so under MCR 2.116(C)(7)." Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Centre, Inc, 471 Mich 411, 419; 684 NW2d 864 (2004). We may review the trial court's decision under the correct subrule. Wickings v Arctic Enterprises, Inc, 244 Mich App 125, 147; 624 NW2d 197 (2000). "In determining whether a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), a court must accept as true a plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations, affidavits, or other documentary evidence and construe them in the plaintiff's favor." Terrace Land Development Corp v Seeligson & Jordan, 250 Mich App 452, 455; 647 NW2d 524 (2002).
The fundamental question on appeal is whether the trial court erroneously determined that plaintiff's claims were for medical malpractice. Indeed, plaintiff acknowledges that if her claims are for medical malpractice, they are untimely. The essential inquiry is whether plaintiff's claims raise questions of medical judgment beyond the realm of common knowledge and experience. Wiley v Henry Ford Cottage Hosp, 257 Mich App 488, 492; 668 NW2d 402 (2003).
Medical malpractice has been defined as the failure of a member of the medical profession, employed to treat a case professionally, to fulfill the duty, which the law implies from the employment, to exercise that degree of skill, care and diligence exercised by members of the same profession, practicing in the same or a similar locality, in the light of the present state of medical science. [Bronson v Sisters of Mercy Health Corp, 175 Mich App 647, 650; 438 NW2d 276 (1989) (citations omitted).]
"(A) complaint
Page 1 2 3 Michigan Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|