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Broehm v. Rochester1/20/2005
n any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader's theory, to grant the relief demanded." (emphasis added)).
I also conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it explicitly rejected Wick's opinion that the restraint had the "essential characteristics of a 'dressing.'" In Ruether, our court held that a finder of fact "is not free to disregard unopposed medical testimony because such testimony concerns issues not within the realm of knowledge of the fact finder." 455 N.W.2d at 478 (citing Olson v. Midwest Printing Co., 347 N.W.2d 43, 46 (Minn. 1984)). There was no medical opinion other than Wick's concerning whether the restraint should have been construed to be a dressing. Whether the restraint had the characteristics of a dressing in terms of nursing or hospital protocol is outside of common knowledge and the court improperly discounted Wick's opinion. The opinion that the restraint was essentially a dressing is an important premise of Wick's overall opinion. Unless Wick's opinion was contradicted by other evidence or was completely unreasonable, the court had to accept it and its implications for purposes of the motion to dismiss and, therefore, the court abused its discretion in summarily rejecting it.
Here, it is important to place in the correct context the district court's statement that checking the restraint "would be in direct disobedience of Dr. Pairolero's orders." At this stage in the litigation, the issue of Dr. Pairolero's instructing nursing staff not to disturb the restraint, in the context of Broehm's theory, may not eliminate a duty to inspect for skin integrity. Rather, it might only shift that inspection duty from nurses to Dr. Pairolero and therefore is an insufficient reason for finding that Wick was not qualified to testify regarding the appropriate standard of care. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it found Wick not qualified to give an expert opinion to support a claim based on a nursing standard of care.
F. Sufficiency of Wick's Disclosure
Having concluded that the district court erred in how it viewed Wick's qualifications, the next step in the analysis is to consider Wick's qualification to give an expert opinion in support of Broehm's nursing malpractice theory. Although the Wick disclosure provides only a cursory recital of Wick's credentials, I agree with the majority that Wick's nursing experience and education provide a sufficient basis for her to be qualified to give an expert opinion about a nursing standard of care. Wick has worked as a nurse since 1984 and has attained a master's degree in nursing. Also, Wick's certification as a geriatric nurse and her current work in nephrology are not so narrow or nontransferable as to lead us to conclude that dressings, bandages, and skin integrity are treated dramatically different in those contexts. Nor does the record support such a conclusion.
Admittedly, a possible shortcoming of the Wick disclosure lies in its description of causation, which fails to explicitly articulate that the lack of inspections resulted in Broehm's pressure necrosis. This shortcoming, however, is not fatal because there are other detailed statements related to causation that provide a sufficiently clear understanding of Wick's proposed explanation of causation. Although it may be inartfully drafted, the Wick disclosure does not contain the kinds of "empty conclusions" that may be used to "mask a frivolous claim." Teffeteller v. Univ. of Minnesota, 645 N.W.2d 420, 428 (Minn. 2002).
My aforementioned conclusions reflect the general deference that should be given to plaintiffs on a motion to d
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