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Carlson v. Friday4/26/2005
Appellant sued respondent for damages because of injuries she suffered from being bitten while grooming respondent's dog, claiming strict liability under Minn. Stat. § 347.22 (2004), the dog-bite statute. The district court granted respondent's summary judgment motion, dismissing appellant's complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed.
Because appellant was the keeper of respondent's dog for purposes of secondary ownership under the dog-bite statute, the statute does not permit her to bring an action against respondent, the primary legal owner of the dog. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Edward Friday is the owner of two German Shepherd/Golden Retriever mixed-breed dogs named Lady and Lucky. In January 2002, Friday first employed Hot Dogs Groomery to bathe his dogs and cut their nails. In March 2002, appellant Jaclyn Marie Carlson (n/k/a Jaclyn Marie Gilbert) began working as an independent contractor, grooming dogs at Hot Dogs. As part of her three-month dog-grooming training, Carlson learned to keep dogs from running loose and disrupting other dogs and how to muzzle a dog whenever it showed signs of aggression. She also learned to contact or transport a dog to a local veterinarian if it ever required medical attention.
In June 2002, Friday returned to Hot Dogs with his two dogs to have them bathed and their nails cut, this time by Carlson. Upon their arrival, Carlson kenneled Friday's dogs while she finished grooming another dog. After finishing with the other dog, Carlson led Lucky from his kennel to the bathing area. Carlson bathed Lucky and then placed him on a grooming cart where she dried him with a towel. Lucky seemed to enjoy the service, but as Carlson began pulling the cart toward the drying area, he suddenly bit her on her face. The wounds to Carlson's face required extensive stitching and left two visible scars.
ISSUE
Minn. Stat. § 347.22 (2004), the dog-bite statute, contemplates two to three parties to a dog-bite action: the victim, the primary legal owner of the dog, and sometimes a secondary owner who is "harboring" or "keeping" the dog. The statute prohibits secondary owners from maintaining actions against non-negligent primary legal owners. Was appellant the keeper of respondent's dog for purposes of secondary ownership under the statute?
ANALYSIS
On appeal from summary judgment, we determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred by misapplying the law. Wartnick v. Moss & Barnett, 490 N.W.2d 108, 112 (Minn. 1992). We review de novo questions of statutory construction. Correll v. Distinctive Dental Servs., P.A., 607 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn. 2000). The application of a statute to undisputed facts is also a question of law, which we review de novo. O'Malley v. Ulland Bros., 549 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Minn. 1996). The dispositive facts are not in dispute here.
Carlson argues that she was not the keeper of Friday's dog for purposes of secondary ownership under Minn. Stat. § 347.22 (2004), the dog-bite statute, because her brief and limited contact with Lucky was insufficient to establish the kind of control that a dog owner generally has over his own dog. Carlson concedes that if she were Lucky's keeper, she would not be able to maintain an action against Friday under the statute.
The district court granted summary judgment as a matter of law in favor of Friday, concluding that Carlson was not entitled to recovery because (1) she was the keeper of Friday's dog for purposes of secondary ownership under the dog-bite statute; and (2) the statute prohibits a secondary owner from maintaining an action against the pr
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