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State v. Knudtson2/1/2005
lty of an attempt to commit that crime . . . ." Minn. Stat. § 609.17, subd. 1 (2002). "Sexual penetration" includes, inter alia, any of the following nonconsensual acts under Minnesota law: sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal intercourse. Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12 (2002).
The supreme court has analyzed a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct, which requires attempted sexual penetration and personal injury . See Dale v. State, 535 N.W.2d 619, 623-24 (Minn. 1995). In Dale, the defendant argued that he never engaged in an act that amounted to a "substantial step" toward commission of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Id. at 623. But the court found that the evidence was sufficient to conclude that the defendant had attempted sexual penetration when he placed the victim in a headlock, threatened to kill her, forcibly restrained her, and ripped off her clothes. Id. at 623-24.
Here, a review of the record shows that at one point, the victim told police that appellant moved to sit on the floor next to the victim with his genitals exposed to the victim and said something to the effect of, "if you do me, I'll do you." Then appellant grabbed the victim in the crotch over the victim's jeans. Because we review all evidence and the legitimate inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that on these facts the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that appellant made a substantial step toward sexual penetration of the victim.
Affirmed.
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