 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Spencer Reed Group5/31/2005
planning to take both the Kansas and Missouri bar exams at a later date.
In appeal of a judge-tried case, all fact issues upon which no specific findings were made by trial court are considered as having been found in accordance with result reached, and judgment will be upheld on any reasonable theory supported by evidence. Weatherwax v. Redding, 953 S.W.2d 162, 167 ( Mo. App. 1997). Despite our misgivings about Spencer Reed's position that it is entitled to a placement fee even for furnishing an unlicensed attorney, our standard of review prevents a conclusion by this court that Law Firm did not waive the breach by Spencer Reed. As a court of error, we must view the judgment in the light most favorable to the verdict and reverse only if the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32. Evidence was presented that Law Firm was informed that Wormington was not a licensed attorney prior to hiring him. It is certainly a reasonable conclusion that by hiring Wormington notwithstanding, Law Firm waived the requirement.
Similarly, Law Firm's argument that Spencer Reed breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing must fail. Missouri law implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract.RGB2, Inc. v. Chestnut Plaza, Inc.,103 S.W.3d 420, 422 n.1 (Mo. App. 2003). The party claiming breach of the implied covenant of good faith must present substantial evidence that it has been violated. Schell v. LifeMark Hosps. of Missouri, 92 S.W.3d 222, 230 ( Mo. App. 2002). Although it is clear that Spencer Reed materially breached the contract, a material breach does not necessarily equal a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing encompasses an "obligation imposed by law to prevent opportunistic behavior, that is, the exploitation of changing economic conditions to ensure gains in excess of those reasonably expected at the time of contracting." Id. "Though phrased in moralistic overtones, good faith does not import into contract law the negligence principles of tort law." Id.
The evidence presented at trial does not support a finding that Spencer Reed violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. There is no evidence that Spencer Reed attempted to intentionally undermine the fulfillment of the contract. That their actions under the contract were incompetent or even negligent is obvious, yet that does not mean that they acted in bad faith.
Law Firm's final argument is that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence. We are naturally reluctant to reverse a judgment on that ground unless the evidence clearly indicates that the trial court reached the incorrect result. Bland v. Schubert, 941 S.W.2d 24, 26 ( Mo. App. 1997). Here, Law Firm presented no evidence from any person involved in the interview to rebut Wormington's claim that he disclosed his lack of a license. That he also admitted that Law Firm's senior partner seemed surprised when Wormington later (when being introduced as an attorney) denied that status does not constitute such evidence necessary for us to believe that the trial court's judgment was against the weight of the evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.
|