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Eves v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County6/21/2005
stances, namely "when a government agent undertakes specific action to protect a person or property," and "by governmental actions that reasonably induce detrimental reliance by a member of the public . . . ." Nelson, 22 (citations omitted). Nelson v. Driscoll informs our decision regarding both of these claims.
In Nelson, an officer stopped a motorist and sought to administer a sobriety test, but due to inclement weather conditions was unable to do so. Nelson, 8-10. Although the officer did not believe he had probable cause to arrest the driver, Trina, he advised her that, given the weather and that she had been drinking, he did not think it safe for her to drive home. Nelson, 10. Trina and her husband then exited the car and stated that they would call a friend for a ride. The officer then drove around the block three times to check on them before leaving the couple for good. Soon afterwards a motorist struck and killed Trina as she walked between lanes of traffic on the highway. Nelson, 12-13.
We concluded that, in pulling Trina over and directing how she and her husband could go home, the officer assumed a duty to protect her from harm. Nelson, 40. The County's actions in this case, however, were qualitatively different. Officer Blume did undertake to look for Zachary during his routine patrol. However, since Blume did not see or have any contact with Zachary, his actions did not influence how Zachary behaved, as in Nelson, nor did Zachary rely, to his detriment, on Blume's actions. The same is true for the actions of the dispatcher.
Eves additionally argues that the dispatcher misinformed the Hospital in stating that the County had no authority to detain Zachary if an officer found him. She contends that under ยง 53-21-129, MCA (1995), in an emergency "a peace officer may take any person who appears to be seriously mentally ill and as a result of serious mental illness to be a danger to others" and briefly detain them to assess their mental health. Without ruling on whether this provision could have applied if a County peace officer had found Zachary, we note that, even if a peace officer could have detained Zachary under this statute, the statement by the dispatcher to the nursing supervisor would still not have created a special relationship between the County and Zachary because Zachary was in no way involved in this exchange. The reliance exception to the public duty doctrine quoted above would not apply because it would have been the Hospital which relied on the statement, not Zachary.
Therefore, we conclude that there was no special relationship that arose out of the actions of County officials such that those officials owed a duty to Zachary.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We Concur:
KARLA M. GRAY
PATRICIA O. COTTER
JOHN WARNER
BRIAN MORRIS
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