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In re Estate of Lunsford4/7/2005
de the following findings of fact relevant to Lunsford's care and maintenance of Candice:
3. Bean and Lunsford separated from each other n November 20, 1982.
4. Lunsford was an alcoholic and too immature for responsibilities of family life and Bean did not want Lunsford to remain in the same household with their little daughter, [Candice].
5. Lunsford agreed with Bean and honored Bean's request to leave.
11. Bean subsequently married Gary Bean (hereinafter "Gary") on March 30, 1985.
12. From the date of separation of Bean and Lunsford, Lunsford visited with [Candice] sporadically on his own initiative.
13. Sometimes, . . . Lunsford's mother, who had an established relationship with [Candice], occasionally picked up her granddaughter for a visit, and . . . Lunsford would occasionally spend time with his daughter then.
14. As [Candice] grew older, either [Candice] or Lunsford would initiate phone calls, visits, or other relational contact.
15. These limited visits between [Candice] and Lunsford usually coincided with lulls in [Lunsford's] alcoholism and/or an increase in the emotional stability of his private life.
16. Just before [Candice's] untimely death, Lunsford attended [Candice's] high school graduation and both had initiated plans for furthering their father-daughter relationship.
17. Throughout [Candice's] minority, Lunsford occasionally offered to pay Bean for some of the care and maintenance of [Candice]. However, Bean refused all such offers.
18. At one point, after one such request, Bean did suggest Lunsford buy [Candice] some clothes [Candice] wanted, to which Lunsford readily complied.
19. However, since the marriage of Bean to Gary, Gary has assisted Bean with the support of [Candice]; and they almost exclusively paid for [Candice's] necessaries.
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that Lunsford had wilfully abandoned Candice under the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 31A-2 and that neither of the two exceptions to N.C.G.S. § 31A-2 applied. Accordingly, the trial court entered an order on 16 April 2002 stating that Lunsford was barred from sharing in the proceeds of Candice's estate.
On appeal from the 16 April 2002order, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Lunsford did not wilfully abandon Candice and was therefore not precluded from inheriting from her under N.C.G.S. § 31A-2. In re Estate of Lunsford, 160 N.C. App. 125, 126, 585 S.E.2d 245, 247 (2003) (Lunsford II). The Court of Appeals further stated that even if Lunsford had wilfully abandoned Candice, he was nevertheless entitled to inherit under the second of the two statutory exceptions to N.C.G.S. § 31A-2, which provides that an abandoning parent may inherit from the abandoned child if the parent "'has been deprived of the custody of his or her child under an order of a court of competent jurisdiction and the parent has substantially complied with all orders of the court requiring contribution to the support of the child.'" Id. at 132-34, 585 S.E.2d at 250-51 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 31A-2(2)). Judge Bryant dissented, id. at 134-37, 585 S.E.2d at 251-53, and Candice's estate filed a notice of appeal based onthe dissent. This Court subsequently allowed Bean's petition for discretionary review as to the additional issue of whether Lunsford falls within the scope of the second of the two statutory exceptions to N.C.G.S. § 31A-2. In re Estate of Lunsford, 358 N.C. 154, 592 S.E.2d 556 (2004). The two issues currently before this Court are therefore (1) whether Lunsford wilfully abandoned Candice under the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 31A-2 and (2) if so, wh
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