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Goldberger6/14/2005
deral action. On or about February 5, 2002, defendant wrote to Seligsohn and enclosed a check in the amount of $1,100 to reimburse him for his contribution to the expert's fee. Seligsohn stated that he continued to receive copies of documents and correspondence related to the case. He was later told by Mazie that a settlement had been reached and Mazie submitted the proposal to Seligsohn for his approval. Seligsohn said that he reviewed the proposal with Bell. Mazie also sent Seligsohn copies of documents for Bell's signature. Seligsohn stated, "When the settlement was consummated, I expected to receive my share of the fee." When he did not receive the fee, he commenced this action.
Baumgarten filed a reply certification in which he stated that plaintiff had not established that the fee plaintiff was seeking was in proportion to the work performed. He further stated that plaintiff had not shown that it had assumed any responsibility for representing the Estate or that the Estate consented to plaintiff's involvement in the litigation. Defendant stated that he did not recall reviewing Seligsohn's June 13, 2001 letter to the magistrate judge. He asserted that he did not pre-approve the letter or ever discuss it with his client. He added that, " t no time did the plaintiff ever request Ms. [Wilkins] to consent to the alleged offer of representation or file a Notice of Appearance in the Estate case."
The motion was heard on May 28, 2004. The judge decided to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment. Her reasons were stated succinctly:
...the simple fact of the matter is,...that there is nothing under the law . . . that satisfies me . . . that he is entitled to a share of this fee. There's not a referral to a certified lawyer. There's not a -- a fee -- splitting agreement...in writing. I think it has to be more than just this agreement in the fashion that he alleges. There certainly has been nothing proposed by way of a quantum meruit....
II.
In our review of an order granting summary judgment, we employ the same standard applicable in the trial courts. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. 1998). Summary judgment may only issue when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R. 4:46-2(c). Like the motion judge, we must view the evidential materials presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and we must determine whether the evidence is sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). " hen the evidence is 'so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,' . . . the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment." Ibid. (quoting from Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed. 2d 202, 214 (1986)).
Plaintiff first argues that the motion judge erred in concluding that plaintiff's claim was barred because the alleged agreement impermissibly required payment of a referral fee. Under R.P.C. 7.2(c) and R.P.C. 7.3(d), lawyers are generally precluded from giving "anything of value" to a person for recommending the lawyer's services, or to secure the lawyer's employment. However, R. 1:39-6(d) permits the division of fees by a certified attorney in certain circumstances:
A certified attorney who receives a case referral from a lawyer who is not a partner in or associate of that attorney's law firm or law office may divide a fee for legal services with the referring attorney or the referring attorney's esta
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