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Grubbs v. Knoll4/15/2005
st is heightened. Szczepanski, supra, 141 N.J. at 366. The court must evaluate "not only the damages prospectively recoverable and actually recovered, but also the interest to be vindicated ... as well as any circumstances incidental to the litigation that directly or indirectly affected the extent of counsel's efforts." Id. at 366-67. The lodestar should be decreased "if the prevailing party achieved limited success in relation to the relief he had sought." Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 23 (2004) (citing Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 336 (1995).
Against this background, Chapman argues that the trial judge should have directed him to pay only ten percent of the Knolls' attorney's fees in accordance with the percentage of liability assigned to him by the jury.
Chapman correctly contends that the trial judge failed to consider the proportionality of Chapman's fee obligation versus the mere $7500 jury verdict against him. The proportionality issue is exacerbated because the trial judge erroneously charged the jury that the percentage of liability assessed against each defendant would be reflected proportionally to the amount of attorney fees. Firstly, the jury has no responsibility in setting the amount of attorney fees; that is exclusively the court's responsibility. There was no reason to mention attorney fees at all to the jury. Secondly, there was no legal basis to impose attorney fees on the Grubbs; and, therefore, it was misleading to the jury to convey the notion that all three groups of defendants, if held liable could be responsible to pay attorney fees. We do not know if this aspect of the charge factored into the jury's liability determination. None of the parties are arguing that it did. Indeed, none of the parties are seeking a new trial on liability. Under these circumstances the ten percent liability assessment against Chapman strongly suggests that Chapman's responsibility for attorney fees and expenses incurred in the trial should mirror the liability percentage.
We recognize that an attorney's time may substantially exceed the result obtained for the client. Where that is the situation, the attorney is obliged to document the effort. Here, where there were three separate claims against three identifiable groups of defendants, Knolls' attorneys did not isolate the time expended in pursuit of the legal malpractice claim against Chapman, to justify an award of attorney fees disproportionate to the result obtained against Chapman.
Chapman contends that the trial judge erred in denying him the benefit of the excess monies in the Stevens settlement. In view of the fact that the Knolls were not entitled to an award of counsel fees with respect to their independent claims against the Grubbs, Chapman asserts that the trial judge erred in applying the excess settlement monies to offset the fees incurred by the Knolls as a result of the claims against the Grubbs, as opposed to the fees incurred as a result of the claims against Chapman. Of course, the settlement effectuated with Grubbs and Stevens occurred well before the trial judge determined the amount of reasonable attorney fees and costs/expenses incurred in the trial. We discern no basis for Chapman to claim the benefit of the monies paid in the Stevens settlement. There has been no windfall to Knolls' attorney. If anything, there is a shortfall where Chapman is only required to pay attorney fees and costs/expenses incurred in the trial in proportion to the liability percentage assessed against Chapman by the jury. It certainly does not offend the principles of Saffer v. Willoughby that attorney fees are an extension of compensatory damages.
We, therefore, determine that Chapman
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