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Belser v. O'Cleireachain3/17/2005
s Court held that the plaintiff could maintain her lawsuit even though it was filed before there was a MRC decision. Rupp, 2002-NMCA-023, 1, 13-16. We considered the early-filed complaint to be valid because an application with the MRC "is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a medical malpractice complaint in district court." Id. 16.
{7} Plaintiff bases her argument on dicta in Rupp that states:
We emphasize that the necessity for an MRC determination prior to the filing of a medical malpractice claim remains a mandatory procedural threshold that must be crossed in the ordinary case. However, failure to comply with this requirement should not result in evisceration of the plaintiff's cause of action; other less drastic remedies are available. For example, if an early complaint is brought to the attention of the district court prior to the MRC decision, the district court should normally dismiss the complaint without prejudice. In addition, if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate a good faith basis for filing the complaint early, it would be appropriate for the district court to consider Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiff.
Id. 21. Plaintiff argues that the dismissal was not appropriate because it "eviscerated her cause of action" and did not consider less drastic alternatives. She contends that the district court should have followed the general policy of deciding cases on their merits. See Universal Constructors, Inc. v. Fielder, 118. N.M. 657, 659-60, 884 P.2d 813, 815-16 (Ct. App. 1994).
{8} Plaintiff's argument distorts Rupp. In Rupp, the defendants did not raise their argument concerning the time of the filing of the MRC until fours years after the MRC decision. Rupp, 2002-NMCA-023, 7, 19. We stressed that the plaintiff's early filing of the complaint did not prejudice the defendants, who were "in no worse position now than they would have been" if the plaintiff had filed her complaint after the MRC decision. Id. 19. In this case, the district court ordered its dismissal when the stay had been in effect for more than eight months. The surgery at issue had occurred more than four years and two months earlier. Defendant argued at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that he was prejudiced by the delay. Rupp does not contemplate the type of inaction that occurred in this case.
{9} Moreover, the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, as proposed in Rupp. See id. 21. After the dismissal without prejudice, Plaintiff was unable to pursue her claim because the statute of limitations had expired. Although the dismissal without prejudice had the final effect of permanently dismissing the case, the district court had already utilized an alternative to dismissal by entering the stay.
The district court has the inherent authority, in its discretion, to "dismiss a case for failure to prosecute when it is satisfied that plaintiff has not applied due diligence in the prosecution" of the case. Prieto v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program, 94 N.M. 738, 742, 616 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Ct. App. 1980). As we have discussed, the stipulation did not give Plaintiff the unbridled discretion to elect when to submit an application to the MRC. Plaintiff did not take any action after the stay to pursue her claim. The district court did not abuse its discretion, or disregard Rupp, by dismissing the complaint.
Conclusion
{10} The district court did not abuse the discretion entailed within its inherent authority or the requirements of Rupp in dismissing this case. We affirm its order.
{11} IT IS SO ORDERED.
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
WE CONCUR:
JONATHAN
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