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Moffat v. Branch5/18/2005
re met, a plaintiff is barred from raising those legal theories that he actually raised in the prior action as well as any theories that he could have raised. Id. 18; Ford, 119 N.M at 414, 891 P.2d at 555; Myers, 100 N.M. at 748, 676 P.2d at 825; see also First State Bank v. Muzio, 100 N.M. 98, 101, 666 P.2d 777, 780 (1983) (stating that a default judgment bars later suit on issues which were or could have been determined in the default action), overruled on other grounds by Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Sproul, 116 N.M. 254, 861 P.2d 935 (1993).
It is clear that Moffat's contract-related claims and his charging lien involve the same claim under a pragmatic, transactional approach because all three factors weigh heavily against him. In Three Rivers Land Co., our Supreme Court provided guidance on the appropriate level of abstraction in transactional analysis by describing the dispute and transaction in that case as "a land contract." 98 N.M. at 696, 652 P.2d at 246. But cf. Bank of Santa Fe, 2002-NMCA-014, 18 (holding that where facts underlying two claims are different in time and origin, they do not arise from a common nucleus of operative facts and are not the same transaction). Through a pragmatic lens, we view the transaction in this case as the representation of Vincoy in her medical malpractice case, the settlement, and associated attorney fees. In terms of factual relatedness, both the federal action and the state suit involve the same facts_the settlement of the medical malpractice action and Moffat's assertion that, due to his representation of Vincoy early in the proceedings, he deserved compensation. The common nucleus of operative facts is the same in both lawsuits; indeed, the federal court evaluated some of the facts (whether Moffat produced a recovery fund for Vincoy and whether he was discharged for cause) in its resolution of the charging lien.
In addition, these related facts would form a convenient unit for trial. When the federal court considered the attorney charging lien, it would have been convenient for the court also to consider whether Moffat was terminated for cause, the value of his services, any reliance by Moffat on Branch's alleged promises, and whether to carve out a portion of the settlement for Moffat. This is particularly true because under the FTCA, any attorney fees paid by Vincoy were capped by federal law at a maximum of twenty-five percent, and it would be a crime to request any additional fees from Vincoy. Moffat I, 2002-NMCA-067, 34. Therefore, it would have been the most convenient time to resolve the attorney fee dispute in the federal action, before the statutory attorney fee was distributed to Branch and Branney and before Vincoy's liability to pay out of the settlement funds was extinguished. Where there would be a substantial overlap between the evidence relevant to both actions, "the second action should ordinarily be held precluded." Restatement ยง 24 cmt. b. Here, it is probable that the witnesses and evidence Moffat brought in the federal action substantially overlap those he seeks to produce now in state court. Furthermore, even when the overlap of evidence or witnesses between the first action and the second would not be substantial, "the second action may be precluded if it stems from the same transaction or series." Id.
Finally, in terms of the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage, it seems reasonable in light of longstanding federal court practice to expect that any and all controversies over attorney fees be litigated fully in the federal court where the lawsuit and settlement are being reviewed. See Pollard v. United States, 69 F.R.D. 646, 647 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (resolving an attorney fee dispute in fede
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