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Tom Growney Equipment Co. v. Jouett5/20/2005
rming his duties as required during his last few months at work for Big Dog.
{39} These arguments, concerning whether Jouett gave adequate notice based on the date of disability as determined by the WCJ, must be resolved on remand following application of the appropriate legal precedent as discussed in this opinion. We remand this case to the WCJ to determine whether Big Dog received written or actual notice of Jouett's accident from the date of disability. See Chavez v. S.E.D. Labs., 2000-NMSC-034, 22, 129 N.M. 794, 14 P.3d 532 ("We believe that when a determination is unsupported, justice requires a remand for entry of proper findings and conclusions.").
D. Contribution
{40} Big Dog argues that the Court of Appeals' contribution holding subjects employers to two sets of claims, one from workers who must comply with notice and statute of limitations provisions and the second from previous employers where these provisions would be inapplicable. Patterson Drilling distinguishes between contribution and apportionment; it argues that contribution is a statutory obligation on one joint tortfeasor to contribute that tortfeasor's share to the discharge of common liability. See NMSA 1978, § 41-3-1 (1947) (defining joint tortfeasors). Patterson Drilling argues that the Court of Appeals erred by injecting contribution, as a fault or negligence principle, into workers' compensation , an explicitly no-fault system. Patterson Drilling also argues that the WCJ is not authorized to hear, consider, or rule on a contribution claim between employers which could result in parallel proceedings in state or federal district court for the same case. We agree that Big Dog and Patterson Drilling raise valid concerns regarding the Court of Appeals' opinion.
{41} Both Patterson Drilling and Big Dog argue that the Court of Appeals' contribution remedy contravenes the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. We agree. NMSA 1978, § 52-1-6(D) (1992) provides that compliance with the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, . . . shall be . . . a surrender by the employer and the workers of their rights to any other method, form or amount of compensation or determination thereof or to any cause of action at law, suit in equity or statutory or common-law right to remedy or proceeding whatever for or on account of personal injuries or death of the worker than as provided in the Workers' Compensation Act and shall be an acceptance of all of the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act and shall bind the worker . . ., as well as the employer . . . . "The Workers' Compensation Act provides exclusive remedies." Section 52-1-6(E). NMSA 1978, § 52-1-8 (1989) provides that employers who have complied with the Act shall not be subject to any other liability whatsoever for the death of or personal injury to any employee, except as provided in the Workers' Compensation Act, and all causes of action, actions at law, suits in equity, and proceedings whatever, and all statutory and common-law rights and remedies for and on account of such death of, or personal injury to, any such employee and accruing to any and all persons whomsoever, are hereby abolished except as provided in the Workers' Compensation Act.
The Court of Appeals' contribution analysis, in which an initial employer may seek contribution from subsequent employers, and the Court's conclusion that contribution was outside the Workers' Compensation Act, is in direct conflict with these provisions.
E. Apportionment Under Section 52-1-47(D)
{42} The Workers' Compensation Act does not provide for contribution by different employers or insurers for disability or medical benefits. Howeve
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