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State v. Collins3/4/2005
rict court that its ruling violated his right to confront the witnesses against him. Thus, we hold that Defendant failed to preserve his Confrontation Clause claim.
5. Defendant's Seizure Was Not Unreasonable
Defendant claimed that his stop was unreasonable and filed a motion to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the stop. The district court denied his motion. "We review the denial of a suppression motion to determine whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts viewed in the manner most favorable to the prevailing party." State v. Brennan, 1998-NMCA-176, 10, 126 N.M. 389, 970 P.2d 161. "While we afford de novo review of the trial court's legal conclusions, we will not disturb the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence." State v. Leyba, 1997-NMCA-023, 8, 123 N.M. 159, 935 P.2d 1171. An officer may stop a vehicle when he has "a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant was violating traffic laws." Brennan, 1998-NMCA-176, 11. " reasonable suspicion may be a mistaken one." Id. 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendant argues that the officer could not see that Defendant's vehicle had crossed left of the center of the roadway because there were gas pumps obstructing his view, it was dark, the distance was too great, there was no line marking the center of the roadway, and the officer was talking to another officer. However, the officer testified that he saw Defendant turning and believed that Defendant's vehicle crossed left of the center of the roadway. Viewing the facts in the manner most favorable to the prevailing party, based on the officer's testimony we conclude there was substantial evidence that he observed Defendant cross left of the center of the roadway. Crossing left of the center of a roadway is a traffic violation under either NMSA 1978, § 66-7-308 (1978), or NMSA 1978, § 66-7-313 (1978). That Defendant was not charged with violating either of these statutes is immaterial because our analysis only focuses on whether the officer articulated a reasonable suspicion that Defendant violated the statutes. See Brennan, 1998-NMCA-176, 10 ("The police may conduct investigatory stops where they have a reasonable, objective basis for suspecting a person is engaged in criminal activity."). There was no unreasonable search or seizure and the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.
6. There Was No Prejudicial Prosecutorial Misconduct or Denial of a Fair Trial
Defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed based on three comments by the prosecutor, which he claims were improper and prejudicial, and based on the district court's failure to take measures to remedy the claimed prejudice from the comments.
Defendant essentially claims prosecutorial misconduct. When a timely objection is made to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for a new trial based upon the prosecutor's conduct, by overruling the defendant's objection to the challenged conduct, or by otherwise failing to control the conduct of counsel during trial. The trial court's determination of these questions will not be disturbed unless its ruling is arbitrary, capricious, or beyond reason. Our ultimate determination of this issue rests on whether the prosecutor's improprieties had such a persuasive and prejudicial effect on the jury's verdict that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.
State v. Duffy, 1998-NMSC-014, 46, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d 807 (citations omitted).
a. The Prosecutor's Reference to the Police Report
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