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State v. Dominguez1/27/2005
fired his weapon. Thus, the evidence supported a jury finding that Defendant was an accessory to shooting at a motor vehicle for Solisz's death. The jury determined that Defendant and his accessory each violated the statute. Defendant may be prosecuted for his own conduct and for the conduct of his accessory. The existence of two victims and the separation in space further supports this conclusion. The jury's conclusion did not violate double jeopardy.
The facts in this case support non-unitary conduct for the two violations of Section 30-3-8. For this reason, we reject Defendant's double jeopardy claim. Because this case involves non-unitary conduct, it is unnecessary for us to determine the appropriate unit of prosecution in Section 30-3-8(B).
V. Conclusion
Based on different statutory elements and purposes, we conclude that the Legislature intended to provide for multiple punishments for the crimes of voluntary manslaughter and shooting at or from a motor vehicle and for the crimes of aggravated battery and shooting at or from a motor vehicle. We also conclude that Defendant's conduct supporting his two convictions for the crime of shooting at or from a motor vehicle was non-unitary. For these reasons, we reject Defendant's double jeopardy claims and affirm the Court of Appeals. We remand to the district court for correction of the judgment in conformity with the verdict.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice
WE CONCUR:
PAMELA B. MINZNER, Justice
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part)
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice (dissenting)
BOSSON, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part)
The principle enunciated in State v. Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018, 130 N.M. 464, 27 P.3d 456 expresses a long-standing tenet of our criminal jurisprudence that, for a single death, there can be only one conviction. In my view, the majority opinion seriously erodes this vital principle. It reaffirms State v. Gonzales, 113 N.M. 221, 824 P.2d 1023 (1992), while professing continuing loyalty to Santillanes. The majority tries to have it both ways. For a single death, Defendant was convicted of both voluntary manslaughter and shooting from a motor vehicle causing that same death. By concluding that Defendant's double jeopardy rights were not violated, the majority walks an invisible line. Respectfully, I am compelled to dissent. I concur with the majority on all remaining issues.
The majority stresses that under the Swafford/Blockburger analysis, these two criminal statutes_manslaughter and shooting from a vehicle_do not violate double jeopardy. Using that test, I agree, and easily so. Under Blockburger, when comparing the elements of these two criminal statutes, one statute is not subsumed by the other; the elements of each are different. That point, however, proves little. The Blockburger analysis only creates a presumption in favor of multiple punishment. The presumption is not conclusive and can be overcome by other indicia of legislative intent. See State v. Santillanes, 2000-NMCA-017, 7, 128 N.M. 752, 998 P.2d 1203 [hereafter Santillanes I].
In both the Court of Appeals opinion in Santillanes and the opinion of this Court, we acknowledged that the two statutes involved in that particular case, vehicular manslaughter and child abuse resulting in death, punished "distinct offenses." 2001- NMSC-018, 5. As with the present situation, the two criminal statutes created offenses with different elements under the Blockburger analysis. Applying only Blockburger, dou
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