State v. Dominguez1/27/2005
ble jeopardy did not bar multiple convictions. But that was not the end of the matter. Judge Apodaca, writing for the Court of Appeals in Santillanes, concluded that the Blockburger presumption "is rebutted by the generally accepted notion that one death should result in only one homicide conviction." Santillanes I, 2000-NMCA-017, 8, adopted by Santillanes, 2001 NMSC-018, 5. In other words, it does not matter that the two criminal statutes possess distinctive elements under Blockburger. Death is different, we said. For one death, there can only be one death conviction, we said. This is settled law.
Importantly, that "generally accepted notion" is not confined to Santillanes; it has been affirmed in several opinions both beforeand after Santillanes was decided. See State v. Reyes, 2002-NMSC-024, 18, 132 N.M. 576, 52 P.3d 948; State v. Mora, 1997- NMSC-060, 64, 124 N.M.346, 950 P.2d 789; State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, 124 N.M. 277, 949 P.2d 660; State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 85, 792 P.2d 408, 417 (1990); State v. Crain, 1997-NMCA-101, 15, 124 N.M. 84, 946 P.2d 1095; State v. Landgraf, 1996-NMCA-024, 31,121 N.M. 445, 913 P.2d 252. Several times in the past we have stated that it is "the death of another the legislature intended to punish, not the manner in which it was accomplished." Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018, 5; see State v. Landgraf, 1996-NMCA-024, 31. That "notion" is now a mainstay of New Mexico law and merits our respect.
The majority opinion seeks to rationalize its betrayal of Santillanes by stating that the shooting from a vehicle statute, Section 30-3-8, is intended only to punish the act of shooting from a motor vehicle, rather than the resulting injury, and therefore there is no double conviction or punishment for the same death. This argument is belied by the very language of the statute. Other than the basic, lesser offense of shooting from a vehicle regardless of consequence (a fourth degree felony), punishment in Defendant's instance is grounded on the harm actually inflicted. Defendant received an enhanced sentence for this harm. Therefore, the statute evinces a specific legislative intent to punish not just the act of shooting from a car, but also the degree of personal injury imposed, in this case death. Clearly, for the drive-by shooter, the greater the harm inflicted, the greater the punishment. Defendant is living proof of that fact.
Defendant's situation is far from unique; today's opinion has far-reaching implications. There are other, similarly phrased criminal statutes. If shooting from a vehicle causing great bodily harm can be charged simultaneously with homicide for the same resulting death, then this changes the paradigm for other criminal statutes that have a "great bodily injury" or "death" enhancement. Unless we limit the present case to the present statute, these other statutes become fair game for overcharging based on multiple offenses for a single death. See NMSA 1978, § 30-3-9 (1989) (battery of school personnel, "great bodily harm or death"); NMSA 1978, § 30-3-9.1 (2001) (battery of sports officials, "death or great bodily harm"); NMSA 1978, § 30-3-16 (1995) (aggravated battery against a household member, "great bodily harm or death"); NMSA 1978, § 30-17-6 (1963) (aggravated arson, "causing a person great bodily harm"); NMSA 1978, § 30- 22-17 (1963) (assault by prisoner, "causing or attempting to cause great bodily harm"). Future defendants could be charged under boutique criminal statutes describing the manner in which the person was killed, in addition to the traditional degrees of homicide. As a matter of sound judicial policy, we should avoid any shift in that direction.
The majority opinion attempts to diff
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