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Wagner v. AGW Consultants5/24/2005
e Legislature limits workers' recovery in a constitutional manner, the fee limitation is a rational means to advance this goal. We adopt the Court of Appeals' analysis and conclusions regarding the remaining issues that were raised on appeal. We affirm.
{33} IT IS SO ORDERED.
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
WE CONCUR:
PAMELA B. MINZNER, Justice
PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
BOSSON, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
{34} I concur in part and dissent in part. Under the facts of this case, I reluctantly agree that the attorney fee limitation in NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54(I) (1993) of the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) passes the rational basis test, and is therefore constitutional, for proceedings before the Workers' Compensation Administration (the Administration). I write separately to express my concerns regarding the effect of the attorney fee limitation on a worker 's right to appeal.
{35} In my mind, the absence of any provision for attorney fees at the appellate level impermissibly burdens the constitutional rights of those workers with complex or time-consuming cases. I believe the Legislature's failure to allow additional fees in the limited number of cases that reach our courts after exhausting the cap is contributing to an intolerable decline in adequate representation in the field of workers' compensation law. While I am not yet convinced that this decline impacts workers' access to the courts to the point of violating due process and equal protection rights in administrative proceedings, I would reach a different result when analyzing the impact of the fee limitation on the right to appeal.
{36} In part, I disagree with the majority because I would apply intermediate scrutiny to the important right to have access to the judiciary for the purpose of an appeal. Under intermediate scrutiny analysis, I would find the cap unconstitutional. I also dissent because I am troubled with the way the majority presents the rational basis test. I think our courts, attorneys, and litigants in New Mexico would benefit from further elaboration.
Rational Basis Test
{37} To begin, I respectfully disagree with the rational basis test presented by the majority. Ever since we overruled the fourth tier of judicial scrutiny defined as heightened rational basis in Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, we have avoided explaining what we meant by our so-called "modern articulation" of the rational basis test. 1998-NMSC-031, 32, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305 (Trujillo III)(overruling, but "subsuming" the fourth tier of rational basis analysis applied in Alvarez v. Chavez, 118 N.M. 732, 738-39, 886 P.2d 461, 467-68 (Ct. App. 1994) and Corn v. New Mexico Educators Fed. Credit Union, 119 N.M. 199, 202-04, 889 P.2d 234, 237-39 (Ct. App. 1994)). I am afraid we continue to avoid explaining that test today in a way that will only perpetuate confusion.
{38} The majority professes that our rational basis test is one test, simultaneously deferential to the validity of the statute but not a "rubber stamp" or "toothless." Maj. Op. 24. The majority then explains the requirements of our rational basis test by using language from City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) that was referred to in Corn, 119 N.M. at 204, 889 P.2d at 239 (requiring legislative classifications to be supported by either a factual foundation or a firm legal rationale). The majority accepts that although Corn and Alvarez were overruled in
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