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Langon v. Matamoros5/26/2005
In this appeal, we consider whether NRS 41.133, which mandates that conviction of a crime resulting in injury to the victim is conclusive evidence of civil liability for the injury, applies to misdemeanor traffic violations.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant John Langon and respondent Julia Matamoros were involved in an automobile accident, as a result of which police issued Matamoros a citation for failure to yield the right of way. Matamoros ultimately pleaded no contest, forfeited bail and paid a fine in connection with the citation.
Langon sued Matamoros for personal injuries under a negligence theory of recovery and proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Matamoros, and the district court entered judgment accordingly. The district court then denied Langon's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in the alternative for a new trial. Langon appeals from the judgment and order denying his post-trial motions.
DISCUSSION
The construction of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. We review an order denying a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.
NRS 41.133 Civil Liability
Langon argues that, under NRS 41.133, Matamoros' conviction pursuant to a no contest plea and forfeiture of bail for failure to yield is admissible as conclusive evidence that she is liable for his injuries. Accordingly, Langon argues that the district court erred in denying his post-trial motions. Matamoros asserts that her plea of no contest did not result in a judgment of conviction of a "crime" for the purposes of NRS 41.133. We agree with Matamoros and hold that NRS 41.133 does not apply to misdemeanor traffic offenses.
We ascribe the plain meaning to a statute that is not ambiguous. When "'the statutory language . . . fails to address issue [impliedly affected by the statute],'" legislative intent controls. "We look to reason and public policy to discern legislative intent." Because the scope of NRS 41.133 is inherently unclear, particularly in relation with other statutory measures governing tort liability, and because a literal reading of the measure would result in consequences unintended by the Legislature, we must undertake an examination of the Legislature's intent with regard to its enactment.
NRS 41.133 states: "If an offender has been convicted of the crime which resulted in the injury to the victim, the judgment of conviction is conclusive evidence of all facts necessary to impose civil liability for the injury."
The Legislature enacted NRS 41.133 from a group of victims' rights bills, which included a companion measure that prohibited a convicted offender from suing victims for injuries sustained during the commission of sexual assault, kidnapping, arson, robbery, burglary, sexual molestation and criminal homicide. The bill was approved and signed by the Governor, and the companion provision became NRS 41.135. The separation of the companion provision as NRS 41.135, from the text of the bill that eventually became NRS 41.133, resulted from an administrative act of revision not performed by the Legislature. The crimes of violence originally enumerated in the bill draft that became NRS 41.135 reflected malum in se offenses that legislators clearly intended NRS 41.133 to include; nothing in the legislative history indicates that legislators contemplated that malum in prohibitum offenses such as traffic violations would be considered crimes for the purposes of the overall measure. We therefore conclude that NRS 41.133 does not apply to misdemeanor violations of state and local traffic codes.
Moreover, the applic
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