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Huntsman v. Aultman Hospital3/28/2005
substantive, the constitution prohibits retrospective application, whereas if the statute is procedural, the statute, as amended, would apply to any cause of action before its effective date." Rumery v. Myles (August 8, 1983), Henry App. No. 7-83-1, 1983 WL 7315.
{ } We find that the revised version of the statute is applicable. This issue was considered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Samuelson v. Susen (1978), 576 F.2d 546. Although we recognize that that case is in no way binding upon this court, we agree with the analysis applied by that court. In Samuelson, the court reasoned that R.C. 2305.251 was procedural because it did not impair the substantive law or the substantive right of the plaintiff to bring a cause of action but only limited the admissibility of some evidence. Therefore, the Samuelson court concluded that R.C. 2305.251 could be invoked by the parties even though this action was commenced prior to the effective date of the statute. Id. at 551--552.
{ } Although Samuelson was considering a previous version of R.C. 2305.251, we find that its reasoning is equally applicable to this most recent version of the statute, recodified at R.C. 2305.252.
{ } Further, in this particular situation, the change to the statute is clearly procedural. The change in the statute that is relevant in this case pertains to the Ohio legislature's apparent decision to foreclose a party from obtaining any information, documents, or records from the peer review committee's records. Previously, courts had interpreted the prior version of the statute (R.C. 2305.251) to allow a trial court to conduct an in camera review of the peer review committee's records to determine whether the privilege applied to individual documents. If the record was available from its origin source, it was not privileged and could be obtained from the peer review committee's records. See, e.g., Doe v. Mount Carmel Health Systems, Franklin App. No. 03AP-413, 2004-Ohio-1407. The current version of the statute makes it clear that there is no need for an in camera inspection because no documents can be obtained from the peer review committee records, only from the records of the original source of the information. We view this relevant revision to be a clarification of the statute's intent. Since this change affects only how information is to be obtained, we find the change to be procedural.
{ } Accordingly, the statute and the relevant revision are procedural. Thus, the revised statute (R.C. 2305.252) applies to matters pending on the effective date of the statute.
{ } The second issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered Aultman Hospital to provide a list identifying the documents. Generally, an appellate court reviews a claimed error relating to a discovery matter under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Lightbody v. Rust (2000), 137 Ohio App.3d 658, 663, 739 N.E.2d 840; Trangle v. Rojas,150 Ohio App.3d 549, 553, 2002-Ohio-6510, 782 N.E.2d 617. However, this case turns on the proper interpretation of R.C. 2305.252, an issue of law. Rulong v. Rulong, Cuyahoga App. No. 84953, 2004-Ohio-6919, citing Ward v. Johnson's Indus. Caterers, Inc. (June 25, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APE11-1531; In re Bailey (March 15, 2001), Tuscarawas App. Nos. 2000AP110071, 2000AP110073, 2000AP110082, 2001 WL 1782893. Thus, the standard of review is de novo. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 147, 593 N.E.2d 286. For the following reasons, we find that the trial court committed reversible error.
{ } R.C. 2305.252 states:
{ } "Proceedings and records within the scope of a peer review committee of a health ca
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