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Porter v. Sidor2/24/2005
es an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable decision." State ex rel. The V Cos. v. Marshall (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 469, 692 N.E.2d 198, 201.
{ } Evid.R. 702(B) provides that a witness may qualify as an expert by reason of his or her specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. Neither special education nor certification is necessary to confer expert status upon a witness. To qualify as an expert, the witness need not be the best witness on the subject. Alexander v. Mt. Carmel Med. Ctr. (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 155, 159, 383 N.E.2d 564, 566. The individual offered as an expert need not have complete knowledge of the field in question, as long as the knowledge he or she possesses will aid the trier of fact in performing its fact-finding function. State v. Baston, 85 Ohio St.3d 418, 423, 1999-Ohio-280, 709 N.E.2d 128, 133; State v. D'Ambrosio, 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 191, 1993-Ohio-170, 616 N.E.2d 909, 915. Moreover, where the fields of medicine overlap and more than one type of specialist may perform the treatment, a witness may qualify as an expert even though he does not practice the same specialty as the defendant. Alexander, supra at 158.
{ } Porter argues that because Grischkan had experience in stoma placements, he is qualified to testify as to the placement of the stoma in the instant matter. However, Sidor contends that Grischkan is not qualified to testify in the instant case because Grischkan had performed only six stoma placements in twelve years, had not performed a stoma placement in the previous ten years, and had never performed a stoma placement following an ileal conduit.
{ } While Sidor's contentions may be true, we find that Grischkan is qualified to testify in the instant matter. Grischkan's deposition testimony demonstrates that he had two main criticisms of Sidor's treatment of the decedent: the placement and creation of the stoma and the post-operative care of the stoma once it retracted.
{ } The record demonstrates that Grischkan is a board-certified general surgeon who has performed six stoma placements in an effort to divert stool, rather than urine, in the last twelve years, and he performed the last one nearly ten years ago. Although he has not recently performed a stoma placement in an effort to divert urine, we find that he is duly qualified to testify regarding the placement, creation, and post-operative care of the stoma. His experience with stoma placement following an ileal conduit may be discredited during cross-examination. However, the credibility or weight given his testimony is for the jury to decide.
{ } Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in granting Sidor's motion in limine excluding Grischkan's testimony. However, Grischkan's testimony should be limited to testifying about placement, creation, and post-operative care of the stoma.
{ } Accordingly, the sole assignment of error is sustained. Judgment reversed and remanded.
This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is, therefore, considered that said appellants recover of said appellee the costs herein.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ANN DYKE, P.J. and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J. CONCUR
JUDGE COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY
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