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Satterfield v. St. Elizabeth Health Center2/17/2005
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{ } Additionally, the settlement agreement between the Satterfields and appellant provides that it "is not a release of any claim, or portion thereof." Thus, by entering into the agreement with the Satterfields, appellant did not extinguish liability on appellees' part. When appellant entered into the agreement, appellees were still subject to full liability on the Satterfields' claims.
{ } The failure to extinguish liability with the high-low agreement distinguishes this case from those cited by appellant, in which the defendants who settled were entitled to indemnification. See Mills v. River Terminal Ry. Co. (C.A.6 2002), 276 F.3d 222; Hope v. Continental W. Ins. Co. (Sept. 29, 2000), 2d Dist. No. 18116; Globe Indemn. Co. v. Schmitt (1944), 142 Ohio St. 595, 53 N.E.2d 790; Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co. (C.A.6 1974), 502 F.2d 138. In those cases, the defendants' settlement agreements extinguished the plaintiffs' claims. In this case, appellant's high-low agreement did not extinguish any claims against any defendants. Rather, appellant's high-low agreement merely limited its potential exposure to a monetary judgment. Therefore, since appellant did not settle any of the Satterfields' claims, it would be inequitable to allow indemnification since appellees still could have been held liable for their own conduct in this dispute.
{ } Furthermore, appellant presented no evidence that appellees were primarily liable while it was only secondarily liable. "Indemnification occurs when one who is primarily liable is required to reimburse another who has discharged a liability for which that other is only secondarily liable." Krasny-Kaplan Corp. v. Flo-Tork, Inc. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 75, 78, 609 N.E.2d 152. In their complaint, the Satterfields alleged both that appellant was secondarily liable because of a principal/agent relationship with appellees and that it was primarily liable. They specifically alleged that the "treatment rendered by the Defendants [which includes appellant] fell below the acceptable standards practiced by other physicians and hospitals and medical personnel under like and similar circumstances." In the high-low settlement agreement, appellant does state that it continues to deny its direct liability. However, since appellant entered into the high-low agreement and the other parties settled too, there was never a determination that appellant was only secondarily liable and that appellees were primarily liable. Without such a determination, appellant is not entitled to indemnification from appellees. Id.
{ } For these reasons, the trial court appropriately granted summary judgment. Therefore, appellant's first assignment of error is without merit.
{ } Appellant's second assignment of error states:
{ } "The trial court erred in denying St. Elizabeth's motion for leave to amend its cross-claim."
{ } Appellant sought to amend its cross-claim to assert contractual indemnity against CCF and remove its claim for contribution. It also sought to eliminate the language "if it should be found liable by virtue of principles of vicarious liability or primary and secondary negligence, that it is entitled to indemnity from such defendants who may be primarily liable to the plaintiffs." In its motion to amend, appellant contended that it paid an amount to the Satterfields based upon its potential vicarious liability.
{ } Appellant contends that the court should have permitted it to amend its cross-claim.
{ } Because this assignment of error relates to adding a contractual indemnification claim, it is moot. Regardless of whether the amended cross-claim was admitted, the only indemnification claim again
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