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Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Crutchfield6/15/2005
e legislature's express intent in the vehicle code in general, and in the "provisions * * * relating to the registration and titling of vehicles" specifically, ORS 801.020(1)(c), was "to provide a comprehensive system for the regulation of all motor and other vehicles in this state," ORS 801.020(1). Moreover, the definitions in the vehicle code, including the code's definition of "owner," ORS 801.375, purport to govern only the construction of the code itself. See ORS 801.100. In contrast, nothing in the insurance code--which does address insurance policies--defines the term "owns" as used in automobile liability policies.
That understanding of the vehicle code comports with the analysis in Fagg. There, the court explained that, in arriving at its conclusion that the Packard had been sold to Day at the time of the accident, it had "not overlooked" the titling, transfer, and registration provisions of the vehicle code. The court stated:
"These statutory provisions recognize that the ownership of motor vehicles does not depend upon the certificate of title or the registration and license of the motor vehicle. [The buyer,] Day, without question, at the time of the accident was at least the equitable owner of the Packard automobile."
142 Or at 364, accord Wisbey, 264 Or at 603 (concluding that there was no coverage under seller's liability insurance: " he Chevrolet automobile was the subject of [the buyer's] ownership without respect to the undelivered certificate of title[.]").
Conversely, nothing in this record indicates that the insured and the insurer intended the policy to incorporate definitions or concepts from the Oregon Vehicle Code. See Joseph v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 313 Or 323, 835 P2d 885 (1992). In Joseph, the court addressed whether a child reared by the plaintiff as his own child, although not related to him by blood, marriage, or formal adoption, was entitled to coverage as a "foster child" within the meaning of the plaintiff's automobile insurance policy. "The question," the court explained, "is whether CSD's definition of 'foster child' under the child welfare statutes is the one to which this insurance policy refers." 313 Or at 328. The court concluded that it was not, instead applying the rules of construction set out above. See also Totten, 298 Or at 769 (parties did not intend to incorporate statutory definition of "aircraft" into insurance policy). The vehicle code is inapposite.
We turn, finally, to defendant's contention that plaintiff's insurance policy should be interpreted to provide coverage even for non-owned automobiles driven by "customers" of an auto dealership. Defendant asks us to interpret the policy language set out above, ___ Or App at ___ (slip op at 3), to mean that an "insured" included any customer of Guthrie Motors who did not have insurance. In its request for reconsideration in the trial court, plaintiff explained why that would be an incorrect interpretation of the policy:
" here are no exceptions to the requirement that a person be driving a Guthrie Motors-owned vehicle with Guthrie Motors's permission in order to qualify as an insured. The 'exceptions' * * * found in Paragraphs 1.a.(2)(a) - (e) * * * are exceptions to the general rule that permissive users of Guthrie Motors-owned vehicles are insureds. In other words, the policy provides in Paragraph 1.a.(2) that every permissive user of a vehicle owned by Guthrie Motors is an insured except for the people described in the five exceptions in Paragraphs 1.a.(2)(a) - (e), one of which * * * is any customer of Guthrie Motors. Thus, * * * the policy plainly provides that a person must be driving a Guthrie Motors-owned vehicle to be an insured, and e
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