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Barackman v. Anderson3/31/2005
ments essential to the application of issue preclusion: (1) " he issue in the two proceedings is identical"; (2) the issue actually was "litigated and was essential to a final decision on the merits in the prior proceeding"; (3) " he party sought to be precluded has had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on that issue"; (4) " he party sought to be precluded was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior proceeding"; and (5) " he prior proceeding was the type of proceeding to which this court will give preclusive effect." Id. at 104.
Ordinarily, a party resisting the application of issue preclusion would attempt to do so based on the alleged absence of one or more of the five Nelson requirements. However, plaintiff in this case does not address in this court the five requirements that Nelson identified as essential to the application of issue preclusion. In fact, the trial court record does not contain the PIP arbitration record or the arbitration decision. Neither party cites any statutes that disclose the requirements, nature, or character of PIP arbitration proceedings, generally. The trial court record discloses only that, before trial, plaintiff moved for summary judgment in response to defendant's affirmative defense based on issue preclusion. Both parties treated the preclusion question raised in plaintiff's summary judgment motion as a legal one, framed solely by plaintiff's legal arguments against according the PIP arbitration decision preclusive effect. Specifically, plaintiff asserted that the legislature did not intend for issues decided in a PIP arbitration to be accorded preclusive effect in a subsequent civil action, and to permit preclusion would unconstitutionally deprive plaintiff of a jury trial on the issue decided in the PIP arbitration. Thus, this case does not present questions concerning whether the PIP arbitration authorized in ORS 742.520(6) provides an outcome that would meet the five Nelson factors. We therefore limit our discussion to those arguments that plaintiff raised in her summary judgment motion and that she continues to assert in this court. We now turn to those arguments.
Plaintiff first maintains that, as a matter of statutory construction, the legislature did not intend that issues decided in a PIP arbitration proceeding be accorded preclusive effect in a subsequent civil action. That argument relies solely on an interpretation of the words of ORS 742.522(1), which provides: "Arbitration under ORS 742.520(6) is binding on the parties to the arbitration."
This court's inquiry regarding the meaning of a statute must be undertaken according to the methodology set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). In accordance with that methodology, we first examine the text and context of the statute, giving words of common usage "their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning." Id. at 611. If the legislative intent is clear from the text and context of the statute, then further analysis is unnecessary. Id.
Examining the words of ORS 742.522(1), they indicate that an arbitration is binding with respect to the parties' dispute, as opposed to advisory or non-binding. Plaintiff, however, offers a different meaning. According to plaintiff, the issues determined in a PIP arbitration are binding only as to the parties' dispute, but cannot be asserted as preclusive in a subsequent proceeding by any person or entity not a party to the PIP proceedings. It is true that the arbitration decides only the dispute between the parties. In this case, the arbitration determined that the collision in question did not cause the injuries to plaintiff's teeth and, according to the plain text of ORS 742.522(1), t
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