McBurney v. Roszkowski6/15/2005
and assigns (hereinafter 'Releasees'), the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby remise, release and forever quitclaim unto said Releasees, (and to any and all other persons, firms, or corporations, their employees, agents, servants, representatives, officers, directors, successors and assigns, whether now known or unknown who are, or may in the future be determined to be liable to Releasors, for and on account of the matters and occurrences hereinafter set forth), any and all manner of actions, causes of action, debts, dues, claims and demands, both in law and in equity, more especially, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, any claim of any nature whatsoever, whether known or unknown, anticipated or unanticipated, arising out of any cause of action which was brought or could have been brought in connection with that action pending in Providence County Superior Court, * * * entitled: John F. McBurney v. Joseph J. Roszkowski."
McBurney maintains that shortly after settling the case, however, he was surprised to learn that the settlement stipulation had specified judgment for defendant rather than the more customary dismissal with prejudice. As a result, McBurney filed a "motion to correct the record" under Rule 60(b), asserting that he had neither consented to nor given his attorney the authority to enter into a stipulation specifying "Judgment for Defendant." After a hearing, a justice of the Superior Court denied the motion, and McBurney appealed to this Court.
While the appeal was pending, this dispute took another serpentine twist when McBurney, on March 22, 2000, commenced another separate cause of action against attorney Armand A. Teixeira. In his complaint, McBurney alleged that Teixeira, while working as an associate of Joseph Roszkowski at the Woonsocket law firm of Zimmerman, Roszkowski & Brenner, also had interfered in McBurney's contractual relationship with Bergeron. McBurney claimed that he and Bergeron had reconciled in March 1990, and that she had rehired him around that same time. According to the complaint, Teixeira, on or about April 6, 1990, informed Bergeron that McBurney had lied to her about the very existence of a proposed settlement in her personal injury case, causing the client to fire McBurney for a second time.
Teixiera soon moved for summary judgment. To support his motion, Teixeira first maintained that McBurney was prohibited from asserting a claim against him by the general release and confidentiality agreement, which applied to not only Roszkowski, but his entire firm, including its employees and associates. Secondly, Teixeira argued that McBurney's suit was indistinguishable from and arose out of the same misconduct alleged in the original complaint against Roszkowski. Thus, Teixeira claimed, McBurney's suit was barred by the applicable ten-year statute of limitations.
In response to Teixeria's motion, McBurney asserted that he had never signed a portion of the general release and confidentiality agreement. He contended that although he had signed the release in his individual capacity, he had not signed the document in the capacity of a corporate officer for McBurney Law Services, as the document purported. Thus, McBurney argued, his signature was either forged or spliced onto the release agreement from another source.
We originally heard oral argument in this matter on January 23, 2001. However, because McBurney's allegations of fraud and forgery had not yet been heard before a trier of fact, we refrained from making a decision at that time. Instead, we remanded the case to the Superior Court for the following findings of fact:
"(1) whether McBurney's attorney had actual or imp
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