 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
McBurney v. Roszkowski6/15/2005
including the highly technical protocol employed by handwriting and document analysts. Robillard testified that he subjected the documents in question to the standard protocol for evaluatuing questioned handwriting. Unlike Patchis, Robillard conducted his tests and examination on the original document, which, he said, allowed him to analyze the pressure placed on the pen used when the questioned signatures were written.
Robillard opined that each of McBurney's signatures on the general release and confidentiality agreement were, in fact, authentic.
On June 10, 2002, the hearing justice rendered findings of fact in accordance with the remand from this Court. He reviewed the evidence and testimony and found that there was no question that McBurney had authorized Cristine to settle with Roszkowski. Thus, in the trial justice's view, Cristine had, at a minimum, the implied authority to execute the judgment stipulation "necessary to effectuate that settlement." Accordingly, the court found " hat Attorney Cristine McBurney, having been duly authorized to settle McBurney's case * * * had actual or implied authority to execute the stipulation for judgment."
The hearing justice also addressed the authenticity of the signatures on the general release and confidentiality agreement. In so doing, the hearing justice accepted Alan T. Robillard's testimony over that of Paula Patchis, noting:
"In the opinion of this Court, having heard the testimony, having reviewed the extensive exhibits forming part of Mr. Robillard's testimony, having heard the methodologies utilized by him, the scientific investigation by him, and being satisfied that his testimony was far more credible that that of Pauline Patches , * * * the Court finds the testimony of Mr. Robillard to be far, far more convincing."
The hearing justice found " hat the signatures of John McBurney, and John F. McBurney, both for himself and for the corporation [McBurney Law Services, Inc.], were in fact his signatures, and, that Cristine McBurney's signature was in fact her signature." The records in both Roszkowski and Teixeira were returned to this Court for our consideration of McBurney's respective appeals in both matters.
Standard of Review
At the outset, we first acknowledge that our review of an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) is limited solely to "the correctness of that order and does not raise questions concerning the correctness of the judgment sought to be vacated." 1 Kent, R.I. Civ. Prac., ยง 60.10 at 457 (1969). Consistent with this principle, this Court previously has recognized that " otions to vacate a judgment are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial justice, and his or her ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion." Medeiros v. Anthem Casualty Insurance Group, 822 A.2d 175, 178 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Gray v. Stillman White Co., 522 A.2d 737, 741 (R.I. 1987)).
In this case, however, our assessment of whether the trial justice abused his discretion in denying McBurney's Rule 60(b) motion is dependent on the validity of the Superior Court's factual findings regarding: (1) the authority of McBurney's counsel to enter into the judgment stipulation specifying "Judgment for Defendant;" and (2) the authenticity of McBurney's signatures on the general release and confidentiality agreement. When reviewing findings of fact by a trial justice sitting without a jury, we apply a similarly deferential standard of review. McEntee v. Davis, 861 A.2d 459, 462 (R.I. 2004). "This Court will not disturb the findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury in a civil matter 'unless such findings are cle
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Rhode Island Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|