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McBurney v. Roszkowski6/15/2005
arly erroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence or unless the decision fails to do substantial justice between the parties.'" Id. (quoting Paradis v. Heritage Loan and Investment Co., 701 A.2d 812, 813 (R.I. 1997) (mem.)). See also Gross v. Glazier, 495 A.2d 672, 673 (R.I. 1985); Lisi v. Marra, 424 A.2d 1052, 1055 (R.I. 1981). In addition, we have recognized that " trial justice's analysis of the evidence and findings in the bench trial context need not be exhaustive, 'if the decision reasonably indicates that exercised independent judgment in passing on the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses it will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly wrong or otherwise incorrect as a matter of law.'" V. George Rustigian Rugs, Inc. v. Renaissance Gallery, Inc., 853 A.2d 1220, 1225 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Connor v. Sullivan, 826 A.2d 953, 960 (R.I. 2003)). Furthermore, mixed questions of law and fact, as well as inferences and conclusions drawn from the testimony and evidence presented at trial, are entitled to the same deference. Wickes Asset Management, Inc. v. Dupuis, 679 A.2d 314, 317 (R.I. 1996).
McBurney's appeal obliges this Court to apply a two-tiered standard of review. First, we must determine whether the findings of fact rendered by the trial justice on remand indicate a misconception or oversight of the material evidence presented to the Superior Court, or whether those findings arise from an incorrect assessment of the law. Then, on the basis of the entire record, we must determine if the denial of McBurney's Rule 60(b) motion should be affirmed.
Analysis and Discussion
Authority to Enter Judgment Stipulation Does the record support a finding that Cristine, as attorney for McBurney, had authority to enter into the stipulation dated March 23, 1999? On this question, McBurney first argues that Cristine's testimony on remand was not credible, and that the trial justice disregarded crucial evidence in his assessment of the witness. In the alternative, McBurney argues that the hearing justice's conclusion that Cristine possessed the authority to settle his claim was incorrect as a matter of law. We disagree with both contentions and will address each separately.
First, we see no indication that the trial justice misconceived or erred in his evaluation of the evidence presented to the court. This Court long has recognized the principle that assigning credibility to witnesses presented at trial is the function of the trial justice, who has the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify in court. Baxter v. Lincoln Mills Co., 70 R.I. 16, 24, 36 A.2d 106, 109 (1944); Rahikka v. Gronstrom, 61 R.I. 270, 274, 200 A. 973, 975 (1938). Also, it is within the province of the trial justice, as part of the fact-finding process, to draw inferences from the testimony of witnesses, and those inferences, if reasonable, are entitled on review to the same weight as his factual determinations. Veach v. Veach, 463 A.2d 508, 510 (R.I. 1983). Our review of the record in this case reveals that Cristine testified that she was specifically and expressly authorized to settle McBurney's claim and enter into a judgment stipulation. In addition, Walsh testified that he was, at all times pertinent to this issue, under the impression that Cristine was representing McBurney and had the authority to negotiate on his behalf. Even McBurney's own testimony indicated that he specifically instructed his attorney to settle his lawsuit against Roszkowski. Considering our deferential standard of review, and in light of this testimony, we see no indication that the trial justice's conclusion that Cristine was authorized to enter int
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