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McBurney v. Roszkowski6/15/2005
ach of the documents were, in fact, McBurney's.
That finding was based largely upon the expert testimony of Alan T. Robillard, who performed a methodical and highly technical analysis of McBurney's handwriting sample. The trial justice determined that Robillard's testimony regarding the signatures on the documents in question was inherently more reliable than that offered by McBurney's expert, Pauline Patchis, whose methods of examination were less impressive to the hearing justice. Rejecting her testimony, the hearing justice concluded, "Patches * * * essentially, among other things, testified almost to the effect that what she does is look at the signatures and note various things[.] * * * lmost anybody could do the same thing[.]"
The Court has recognized that " t is the duty of the triers of fact to examine and consider the testimony of every witness regardless of his qualifications, and to grant to particular testimony only such weight as the evidence considered as a whole and the proper inferences therefrom reasonably warrant." Kyle v. Pawtucket Redevelopment Agency, 106 R.I. 670, 673, 262 A.2d 636, 638 (1970). Moreover, " his process of evaluating the witnesses and their testimony applies whether a case is tried to a jury or to a judge sitting without a jury[.]" Id. Moreover, we specifically have held that " ust as a trial justice may pick and choose among evidence presented by laypersons, he or she may do the same when dealing with evidence of experts." Harvard Pilgrim Health Care of New England, Inc. v. Gelati, 865 A.2d 1028, 1035 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Ferland Corp. v. Bouchard, 626 A.2d 210, 216 (R.I. 1993)).
Here, the hearing justice articulated a clear basis for his decision to rely on Robillard's testimony and to reject that of Patchis. We are of the opinion that to do so was well within the hearing justice's discretion. Thus, our only concern is to determine whether the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise wrong. Nothing has been presented to us to indicate that the hearing justice erred in such manner. Accordingly, we decline to accept an invitation to second-guess his finding that McBurney's signatures on the general release and confidentiality agreement were authentic.
Motion to Vacate under Rule 60(b)
In light of the findings of fact made by the Superior Court on remand, we are of the opinion that the trial justice's denial of McBurney's Rule 60(b) motion to vacate did not constitute an abuse of discretion. In reviewing a Rule 60(b) motion after a consent judgment has been entered, this Court specifically has held that "[the judgment] cannot 'be opened, changed, or set aside without the assent of the parties in the absence of fraud, mutual mistake or actual absence of consent * * *.'" DeFusco v. Giorgio, 440 A.2d 727, 729 (R.I. 1982) (quoting Douglas Construction and Supply Corp. v. Wholesale Center of North Main St., Inc., 119 R.I. 449, 452, 379 A.2d 917, 918 (1977)). It is the burden of the moving party to convince the trial justice that legally sufficient grounds exist to warrant the vacation of judgment under Rule 60(b). See Defusco, 440 A.2d at 730.
On remand, McBurney was provided a full and fair opportunity to present evidence that he neither consented to the judgment stipulation nor signed the release documents. We see no error in the findings on these two specific questions. Thus, we hold that the trial justice's denial of McBurney's Rule 60(b) motion did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Superior Court judgment and remand the record in this case to that court.
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