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McKeen v. American Home Products Corp.4/14/2005
DECISION
Defendant Wyeth, Inc. ("Wyeth"), formerly known as American Home Products Corp., moves this Court for summary judgment against the Plaintiff, Cathy McKeen ("McKeen"), on grounds that McKeen's product liability claim is barred by the three year statute of limitations provided at G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14.1. McKeen objects, contending that there are issues of material fact as to when her cause of action accrued. Jurisdiction is pursuant to R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 56.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment "is a harsh remedy and must be applied cautiously." Avco Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 679 A.2d 323 (R.I. 1996) (quoting Mallette v. Children's Friend and Svc., 661 A.2d 67, 69 (R.I. 1995)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial justice examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and affidavits of the parties to determine whether the evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact. Volino v. General Dynamics, 539 A.2d 531, 532-33 (R.I. 1988). A party who opposes such a motion must not rely solely on pleadings but must assert facts that raise a genuine issue to be resolved. Id. The trial justice must "view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, drawing from that evidence all reasonable inferences in support of the non-moving party's claim but without resolving the facts." Holliston Mills, Inc. v. Citizens Trust Co., 604 A.2d 331, 334 (R.I. 1992). If no issues of material fact exist, then the trial justice must determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Rustigian v. Celona, 478 A.2d 187, 189 (R.I. 1984)).
ANALYSIS
McKeen suffered a hemorrhagic stroke on October 1, 1997. She subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Defendants in June of 2002, alleging that the Defendants' product, Robitussin CF(r), which contained phenylpropanolamine ("PPA"), caused the stroke, and claiming that the Defendants knew or should have known of the risks posed by PPA and failed to warn her of them. The Defendants claim that McKeen became aware of a possible connection between her stroke and PPA in or before October of 1998, at which time her cause of action accrued. Thus, they argue, by filing her suit more than three years after October of 1998, as required by § 9-1-14.1, she filed out of time.
Whether a statute of limitations has run is a factual question that must be determined by a jury if in dispute. Dionne v. Baute, 589 A.2d 833, 935 (1991) ("when the evidence raises factual questions involving the statute of limitations, such questions should be submitted to the jury"). In a product liability suit involving injury caused by a drug, "where the manifestation of an injury, the cause of that injury, and the person's knowledge of the wrongdoing by the manufacturer occur at different points in time," the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that "the running of the statute of limitations. . . begin when the person discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the wrongful conduct of the manufacturer." Anthony v. Abbott Laboratories, 490 A.2d 43, 46 (R.I. 1985).
The Supreme Court has specifically rejected arguments that the cause of action should instead accrue when the plaintiff has learned or reasonably should have learned of a possible causal connection between the injury and the product in these types of cases. See id. at 44, 48-49 (Weisberger, J., dissenting). In so deciding, the Supreme Court reasoned that the policy of barring stale claims was outweighed by the policy of allowing those whose rights have been violated, though the violation was undiscovered or undi
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