Towne v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.4/7/2005
e jury's verdict." Shupe v. Settle, 315 S.C. 510, 515, 445 S.E.2d 651, 654 (Ct. App. 1994). In making this determination, the judge must view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Gilliland v. Doe, 357 S.C. 197, 199, 592 S.E.2d 626, 627 (2004). The trial court is concerned with the existence of evidence, not its weight. Curcio v. Caterpillar, Inc., 355 S.C. 316, 320, 585 S.E.2d 272, 274 (2003). The trial judge must deny the motion when the evidence yields more than one inference or its inferences are in doubt. Jinks v. Richland County, 355 S.C. 341, 345, 585 S.E.2d 281, 283 (2003).
"When considering the motion, neither this court nor the trial court has authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony and evidence." Reiland v. Southland Equipment Service, Inc., 330 S.C. 617, 634, 500 S.E.2d 145, 154 (Ct. App. 1998). We will reverse the trial court's ruling on a JNOV motion only when there is no evidence to support the ruling or where the ruling is controlled by an error of law. Hinkle v. Nat'l Cas. Ins. Co., 354 S.C. 92, 96, 579 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2003).
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Judicial Estoppel
Towne asserts the trial court erred in granting State Farm's motion for JNOV in finding judicial estoppel precluded Towne from taking the position argued to the jury. We agree.
Judicial estoppel is an equitable concept that prevents a litigant from asserting a position inconsistent with, or in conflict with, one the litigant has previously asserted in the same or a related proceeding. Hayne Fed. Credit Union v. Bailey, 327 S.C. 242, 251, 489 S.E.2d 472, 477 (1997). Judicial estoppel as an equitable concept is a discretionary doctrine and should be applied sparingly with clear regard for the facts of the particular case. Hawkins v. Bruno Yacht Sales, 342 S.C. 352, 368, 536 S.E.2d 698, 706 (Ct. App. 2000). The application of judicial estoppel must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and must not be applied to impede the truth-seeking function of the court. Carrigg v. Cannon, 347 S.C. 75, 83-84, 552 S.E.2d 767, 772 (Ct. App. 2001). The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure the integrity of the judicial process, and to prevent manipulation of the judicial system by the litigants. Quinn v. Sharon Corp., 343 S.C. 411, 414, 540 S.E.2d 474, 475 (Ct. App. 2000).
In Carrigg v. Cannon, 347 S.C. 75, 83, 552 S.E.2d 767, 772 (Ct. App. 2001), this court provided the following general guidelines for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to apply: (1) two inconsistent positions taken by the same party or parties in privity with one another; (2) the positions must be taken in the same or related proceedings involving the same party or parties in privity with each other; (3) the party taking the position must have been successful in maintaining that position and have received some benefit; (4) the inconsistency must be part of an intentional effort to mislead the court; and (5) the two positions must be totally inconsistent. Recently, in Cothran v. Brown, 357 S.C. 210, 215-16, 592 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2004), our supreme court reaffirmed the Carrigg guidelines, holding them to be necessary elements for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to apply.
The evidence in this matter fails to satisfy the fourth necessary element of judicial estoppel. The Cothran court held, as an element of judicial estoppel, the inconsistency must be part of an intentional effort to mislead the court. Id. at 215-16, 592 S.E.2d at 632. We find no evidence Towne sought to intentionally mislead the trial court. To the contrary, the issue advanced to the jury in the declaratory judgment a
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