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Owens v. F.E.M. Electric Association3/9/2005
ne 25, 1999, rendering SDCL 62-7-35 applicable under the distinction made in Faircloth.
[ .] Owens argues that because the letter of June 25, 1999 was not specific, he did not know that it was related to his back injury. Therefore, Owens asserts the letter was ineffective in communicating Federated's intent to deny his claim for the back injury. However, when read as a whole it is apparent that Federated communicated its intent to deny all further claims for injuries resulting from the October 16 accident. Federated told Owens in the June 25 letter that because the injury of October 16 was resolved it was denying any further claims from that accident and would not pay any additional benefits arising from it. Furthermore, Federated informed Owens of the two year period within which he could challenge that decision. The letter stated that Federated had paid all benefits to which Owens was entitled. Since Federated had previously denied his claim for the back injury on June 1, Owens was given previous notice as to Federated's position on that injury. Because Owens alleges that his back injuries were a result of the October 1998 accident, when he was informed by Federated that he would receive no further compensation for that accident other than what Federated had already deemed compensable, he received notice that he had two years to request a hearing on the denial. This notification of Federated's intent to deny further coverage for any claims arising from the October 16 injury satisfied the requirements of SDCL 62-7-35 and was sufficient notice to inform Owens that the two year statute of limitations had begun.
[ .] The wording of SDCL 62-7-35 does not require that there be specific language in the letter to the employee indicating that the benefits are being denied in whole or in part. As stated in Faircloth, SDCL 62-7-35.1 applies when no denial notice is given. The June 25, 1999, letter gave notice of denial.
[ .] Additional arguments raised by Owens are without merit. Owens attempts to refute notice of the denial of the claim because 1) Federated assigned two different claim numbers to his two different injuries; and 2) Federated's June 25 letter was not in strict compliance with SDCL 62-7-35. First, as Roxanne Sewell, Federated's claim supervisor, testified, the reason for the two claim numbers was simply to avoid confusion in Federated's office. The two claims were kept in the same file so that whoever was reviewing the claims would know of the relationship between the two injuries. Assigning different claim numbers was merely a record-keeping procedure employed by Federated so that it could handle the shoulder and back injury complaints more efficiently. The existence of the two claim numbers is insufficient to support Owens' position, particularly when Owens related his back injury to October 16 and Federated informed him that it was denying any further claims resulting from the October 16 accident. There is nothing in the record indicating that Owens in any way relied to his prejudice on the fact that there were two files.
[ .] Owens also claims that case law requires a standard of strict compliance with a statutory workers compensation scheme. See Invie v. Control Data Corp, 247 NW2d 425 (Minn1976); Cibor v. Fabricon Products Company, 150 NW2d 769 (Mich 1967); Belton v. Traynor, 381 F2d 82 (4thCir 1967). These cases are unpersuasive. All of these cases deal not with notice to the claimant, but notice to the appropriate workers compensation board. These authorities do not merit departure from the finding that the June 25 letter supplied sufficient notice to Owens of Federated's intent to deny all further claims from the October 1998 accident.
[ .] O
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