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Shepherd v. Fregozo6/13/2005
, stated:
The expansive interpretation applied by a majority of * * * (the supreme court in Barnes v. Powell (1971), 49 Ill.2d 449, 275 N.E.2d 377), leads us to conclude that, presented with the issue at bar, our Supreme Court would interpret Section 143a of the Insurance Code as a direction to insurance companies to provide uninsured motor vehicle coverage for "insureds," regardless of whether, at the time of injury, the insureds occupied or operated vehicles declared in the subject policy. (Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co.)
Since the exclusionary clause in the instant case is virtually identical to the clause in Squire, and since it makes coverage dependent upon the insured being in a vehicle listed in the policy, it violates section 143a and is rendered unenforceable by section 442.
Roby v. Illinois Founders Ins. Co., 372 N.E.2d 1097, 1100-01 (Ill.App.Ct.1978).
In Briones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.1990), the Texas Court of Appeals, abandoning prior holdings to the contrary, followed the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Stracener v. United Svc. Auto. Ass'n., 777 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1989) in holding that article 5.06-1 of the Texas Insurance Code mandated that uninsured motorist policies provide coverage. Said the Court:
Having taken this position, we conclude that under the facts of this case and the uncontroverted evidence, that to deny Briones recovery under the uninsured motorist clause of his family policy would be to frustrate the intent of the legislature to provide protection for conscientious motorists from "financial loss caused by negligent financially irresponsible motorists" as is mandated by the inclusion of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in the Texas Insurance Code.
Briones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 790 So.2d 70, 74 (Tex.App.1990).
In construing the "regular use" exception as to uninsured motorist coverage in a case where a deputy sheriff was driving his patrol car when injured by an uninsured motorist, the Court of Appeals of Washington upheld the exclusion, pointing out that the named insured had the option to reject uninsured motorist coverage in its entirety. Under Washington's less-than-broad coverage uninsured motorist statute, the Court held:
Moreover, to interpret regular use to exclude the patrol car violates the purpose of the exclusion by significantly increasing the risk to Safeco without any corresponding increase in premiums. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 103 Wash.2d at 712-13, 694 P.2d 1087. The daily use of a patrol vehicle, often in risky driving situations, substantially increases the risks of accidents. Consequently, we find the purpose behind the statutory exclusion is met and the court did not err in finding the policy excluded coverage.
Drollinger v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 797 P.2d 540, 543 (Wash.App. 1990).
Colorado is a no-fault jurisdiction that has gone through a decades-long struggle with uninsured motorist coverage and public policy. The controlling statute in Colorado, like that in Tennessee, provides that the named insured may reject uninsured motorist coverage in writing. In construing an "owned-but-uninsured" exclusionary clause relative to Colorado's uninsured motorist statute and its no-fault insurance law, the Colorado Court of Appeals acknowledged the general split of authority among sister jurisdictions.
A split of authority exists among the many jurisdictions that have addressed the effectiveness of the exclusion. 12A G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, ยง 45:636 (M. Rhodes rev. 2d ed. (1981); 2 N.P. Terry, No-Fault & Uninsured Motorist Automobile Insuran
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