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Shepherd v. Fregozo6/13/2005
otorist exclusion, under the circumstances of this particular case under consideration, operates to deprive the Plaintiff of the protections required under the Tennessee Uninsured Motorists Statute?"
Uninsured motorist insurance coverage first appeared in Tennessee following the passage of chapter 371 of the Public Acts of 1967. In 1974, our supreme court interpreted the uninsured motorist statute to provide "limited" rather than "broad coverage".
Under our research there appears to be two theories in regard to offset provisions in policies containing uninsured motorist coverage based on the legislative intent in the enactment of uninsured motorist statutes. The first theory is based on a finding the legislative purpose of such statutes is to provide full coverage up to the policy limits so long as payments under the uninsured motorist coverage, plus any payments received from other sources, do not exceed insured's actual damage. This is termed broad coverage and any offsets in the policies inhibiting such full coverage are held void. The second theory is based on a finding the legislative purpose of such statutes is to provide insured a recovery only up to the statutory minimum required without regard to insured's actual damages, unless such be less than the statutory minimum. This is termed limited coverage and under such, by virtue of set-off provisions in a policy, an insured's statutory minimum coverage can be reduced by amounts received from other sources.
It results, and we so hold, by enactment of T.C.A. s 56 - - 1152 as a section of our uninsured motorist statutes, it is the legislative purpose to provide an insured motorist a right of recovery under the uninsured motorist provisions of his policy only up to the statutory required minimum (T.C.A. s 56 - - 1148), and provisions in such policies, approved by the Commissioner of Insurance, operating to reduce such coverage where other coverage or benefits are available to the insured arising from accident causing the loss, are valid if such provisions do not operate to deny payments to an insured of less than the statutory minimum.
Terry v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 510 S.W2d 509, 513 (Tenn.1974).
Justice Harbison provided further guidance in Hill v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 535 S.W.2d 327 (Tenn.1976).
Authorities accepting the rationale of the case just cited point out that vehicular liability insurance is ordinarily written upon and follows particular scheduled vehicles. It is not written upon named individuals, and it is not like general health or accident insurance coverage. The liability policy covers a scheduled vehicle, and extends its protection, through omnibus clauses, not only to the named insured but to members of his family and other persons using the vehicle with permission, subject to prescribed conditions and exclusions.
Other authorities, holding that exclusions such as that involved in the present case are not valid, have reasoned that uninsured motorist coverage should be analogized to broad personal insurance, and that it should not be geared to or limited by coverage on particular scheduled vehicles. They emphasize that the statutes speak in terms of "protection of persons" rather than vehicles.
Both lines of authority are supported by cogent reasons. By statute, uninsured motorist insurance coverage is appended to or made supplemental to vehicular liability insurance, so that the concepts of vehicular coverage do have relevance; on the other hand, the statutes refer to the protection of persons, not vehicles.
Faced with these somewhat mixed concepts, the courts have had to construe statutory language in an atte
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