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Shepherd v. Fregozo6/13/2005
mpt to carry out legislative policy. Each case, in the last analysis, turns upon the terms and provisions of a particular state statute and its language with respect to uninsured motorist coverage.
The uninsured motorist statutes of most states do not contain provisions similar to those contained in T.C.A. § 56-1152. [Now Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1205.] In previous cases, this Court has noted the difference in statutory provisions, and has construed T.C.A. § 56-1152 [Now Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1205.] as denoting "a legislative purpose to provide less than broad coverage. Terry v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 510 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Tenn.1974). In the latter case, the Court sustained a policy provision providing an offset against the uninsured motorist coverage for any amount recovered under workmen's compensation .
Hill, 535 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Tenn.1976). (footnotes omitted.)
The precise issue which controls the disposition of this case involves an exclusion for
bodily injury suffered while occupying a motor vehicle:
(a) owned by;
(b) furnished to; or
(c) available for the regular use of;
you or a relative, but not insured for auto liability coverage under this policy. It also does not apply to bodily injury from being hit by any such motor vehicle.
This standard "regular use" exclusion predates the advent of uninsured motorist coverage, it being born and matured by cases interpreting basically the same exclusionary language as to liability coverage. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals provides the readily apparent purpose of the exception, which is standard in automobile liability policies and in policies providing uninsured motorist coverage.
The great weight of authority is in accord with the interpretation of this provision by Judge Chestnut in Aler v. Travelers Indemnity Co., D.C.Md., 92 F.Supp. 620, 623, where he said:
This case involved the construction and application of the so-called "drive other automobiles" clause of the present standard automobile liability policy. The general purpose and effect of this provision of the policy is to give coverage to the insured while engaged in the only infrequent or merely casual use of an automobile other than the one described in the policy, but not to cover him against personal liability with respect to his use of another automobile which he frequently uses or has the opportunity to do so . . . .
Campbell v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 211 F.2d 732, 736 (4th Circuit 1954).
Further expositive of the "regular use" exclusion in its applicability to the case at bar are those cases where an employer provides a fleet of vehicles which may be randomly assigned to a particular employee. In City of Jackson v. Freeman-Howie, Inc., 121 So.2d 120, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held:
The proof clearly shows that insured's employer furnished for the regular use of insured a truck, either one of about ten, although insured did not regularly use any particular one of the fleet of ten trucks. Two or three trips a week were made by insured as driver of one of the ten trucks of his employer, and he made other trips as helper on one of the trucks. It cannot be said that insured's use of the employer's trucks was other than regular use.
The question narrows to this: Does the term "regular use" in the exclusionary clause refer to one specific automobile? As stated, the obvious purpose of the exclusionary clause is to limit the extension of medical payments coverage to casual or infrequent use of occupancy of automobiles other than the one defined in the policy, in this case th
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